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Black Voices Matter Too: Counter-Narrating Smithers v The Queen
Abstract
This article presents a legal history and counter-narrative of the Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous
1977 decision in Smithers v The Queen. Smithers is a criminal law case that focused largely on the issue
of causation and is likely taught in most if not all Canadian law faculties annually. The case arose out of a
fight following a midget league hockey game where one of the combatants died. In constructing its brief
narrative of the facts, the Court drastically understated the racial dynamics that were in play during the
game which prompted Paul Smithers, a Black and white biracial teenager to confront Barrie Cobby, who
was white, and his primary racial antagonist. In framing its narrative, the Court caricatured Smithers as a
Black aggressor preying on Cobby. Drawing from critical race theory, this article advances a detailed
counter-narrative challenging the Court’s official account which ignored Paul Smithers’s experiences and
interpretation of events leading to Cobby’s death. The article relies on primary sources such as the
original trial transcripts including Smithers’s testimony and those of defence witnesses. It also draws on
the parties’ factums and newspaper articles published contemporaneously with the original trial, in
addition to those published as the case was being appealed. Such news articles include interviews with
key witnesses like Smithers and other individuals, which provide added insights on what transpired.
Despite the racialized dynamics located within the decision, it has been overlooked in various Canadian
legal histories centered on race. Thus, the article seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature on race and
Canadian legal history. Through a broader historical account offered in this study, one learns not only
about the intentional omissions in the Court’s narrative in a racially polarized case, but that its
construction of events and of the accused effectively and implicitly advanced a white supremacist
account of what took place. In addition to scrutinizing the Court’s narrative, this study examines how
Crown prosecutors minimized the role of racism within the case and its impact on Smithers. Lastly, this
article emphasizes how racial bias may have played a role in one of the juror’s decision-making, rendering
Smithers’s conviction suspect.
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This article presents a legal history and counter-narrative of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
unanimous 1977 decision in Smithers v The Queen. Smithers is a criminal law case that focused
largely on the issue of causation and is likely taught in most if not all Canadian law faculties
annually. The case arose out of a fight following a midget league hockey game where one
of the combatants died. In constructing its brief narrative of the facts, the Court drastically
understated the racial dynamics that were in play during the game which prompted Paul
Smithers, a Black and white biracial teenager to confront Barrie Cobby, who was white, and
his primary racial antagonist. In framing its narrative, the Court caricatured Smithers as a
Black aggressor preying on Cobby.
Drawing from critical race theory, this article advances a detailed counter-narrative
challenging the Court’s official account which ignored Paul Smithers’s experiences and
interpretation of events leading to Cobby’s death. The article relies on primary sources such as
the original trial transcripts including Smithers’s testimony and those of defence witnesses.
It also draws on the parties’ factums and newspaper articles published contemporaneously
with the original trial, in addition to those published as the case was being appealed. Such
news articles include interviews with key witnesses like Smithers and other individuals,
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which provide added insights on what transpired. Despite the racialized dynamics located
within the decision, it has been overlooked in various Canadian legal histories centered on
race. Thus, the article seeks to fill a gap in the scholarly literature on race and Canadian
legal history. Through a broader historical account offered in this study, one learns not only
about the intentional omissions in the Court’s narrative in a racially polarized case, but that
its construction of events and of the accused effectively and implicitly advanced a white
supremacist account of what took place. In addition to scrutinizing the Court’s narrative, this
study examines how Crown prosecutors minimized the role of racism within the case and its
impact on Smithers. Lastly, this article emphasizes how racial bias may have played a role in
one of the juror’s decision-making, rendering Smithers’s conviction suspect.
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RACIAL VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK PEOPLE1 has been a persistent problem in

North America and elsewhere for centuries. Though such racial violence was
already well-known among Black communities—given their lived experiences—
over the past decade there has been a renewed sense of urgency to confront the
unwarranted state and non-state violence inflicted on such communities. This
reinvigorated consciousness has given rise to the Black Lives Matter movement,

1.

Though I use the term “people” here, I recognize that this singularity can often obscure the
diverse experiences and identities that individuals within a notional group or community
might have, for example, with respect to gender, sexual orientation, socio-economic status,
disability, age, language, national origins, or other characteristics. Yet, when it comes to
racism in North America and elsewhere, this discrimination is arguably a common aspect
that most Black people as well as Indigenous people and people of colour face, regardless of
other identities. That said, the experience of racism may intersect with other identities.
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which was started in the United States and has spread well beyond its borders.2
The 25 May 2020 police murder of George Floyd, a Black man in Minnesota,
has, in particular, inspired an upsurge in public protests in the United States.3
Not forgotten, however, are the many prior and subsequent homicides or acts
of aggression perpetrated by police officers across the country. The protests have
expanded beyond the United States and emerged in countries, such as Canada,
that have their own very troubled histories of racial violence against Black people,
Indigenous people, and people of colour.
This broader and more sensitive awareness has been partly due,
in no insignificant measure, to various video recordings capturing lethal or
otherwise brutal police conduct toward Black lives.4 Such striking visual evidence
and the proliferation of protests seem to have motivated responses from various
public officials and institutions, however belated, to recognize systemic racism
in their midst. For example, in a noteworthy letter issued by the Washington
Supreme Court to members of the state judiciary and legal profession, the
justices provided several significant acknowledgments concerning systemic
discrimination against Black people.5 Writing collectively, the justices asserted,
“The devaluation and degradation of [B]lack lives is not a recent event. It is a
persistent and systemic injustice that predates this nation’s founding.”6 The court
rooted the injustice plaguing the country in “the individual and collective actions
of many, and it cannot be addressed without the individual and collective actions

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

See Garrett Chase, “The Early History of the Black Lives Matter Movement, and the
Implications Thereof ” (2018) 18 Nev LJ 1091.
See Derrick Bryson Taylor, “George Floyd Protests: A Timeline,” The New York Times
(28 March 2021), online: <www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html>;
Helier Cheung, “George Floyd Death: Why US Protests Are So Powerful This Time,” BBC
News (8 June 2020), online: <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52969905>; Jason
Silverstein, “The Global Impact of George Floyd: How Black Lives Matter Protests Shaped
Movements Around the World” (4 June 2021), online: CBS News <www.cbsnews.com/news/
george-floyd-black-lives-matter-impact>.
See Nicol Turner Lee, “Where Would Racial Progress in Policing Be Without Camera
Phones” (5 June 2020), online: Brookings <www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/05/
where-would-racial-progress-in-policing-be-without-camera-phones>; “Black Lives Upended
By Policing: The Raw Videos Sparking Outrage,” The New York Times (19 April 2018),
online: <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/19/us/police-videos-race.html>.
Letter from the Supreme Court, State of Washington, to Members of the Judiciary
and the Legal Community (4 June 2020), online (pdf ): <www.courts.wa.gov/content/
publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/Judiciary%20Legal%20Community%20
SIGNED%20060420.pdf>.
Ibid.
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of us all.”7 Assuming responsibility for its own institutional contribution to such
actions, the court posited, “As judges, we must recognize the role we have played
in devaluing [B]lack lives.”8 While recognizing the inability to turn back time,
they affirmed, “We can develop a greater awareness of our own conscious and
unconscious biases in order to make just decisions in individual cases.”9
The Washington Supreme Court’s admission of its own participation in
devaluing Black lives should inspire the judiciary in other jurisdictions to reflect
on their own past and present conduct. There are lessons to be learned from our
legal pasts. Correspondingly, legal scholars and historians can play an important
function in researching when, why, and how such judicial devaluations have
transpired. These lessons may be instructive for courts, the practicing bar, and
those teaching and learning within the legal academy and cognate disciplines.
Interrogating past decisions is also important where the judicial depreciation
of Black lives may neither be especially obvious from reading a particular
decision nor necessarily reflected in the outcome. Needless to say, racism has
been a persistent scourge affecting countless societies, including Canada’s.
Despite refusals by many, including some political figures, Canadian courts have
recognized valid and tangible concerns about systemic racism within the country.10
Various scholars have documented Canada’s long-standing and endemic racism
towards Black people, Indigenous people, and people of colour.11 Despite such
7.
8.
9.
10.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See R v Williams, [1998] 1 SCR 1128; R v Parks (1993), 84 CCC (3d) 353 (Ont CA)
[Parks]; R v Morris, 2018 ONSC 5186; R v Jackson, 2018 ONSC 2527; R v Le, 2019 SCC
34. However, such recognition has not always been consistent, and courts have not been as
attentive to concerns about race as they should have. See David M Tanovich, “The Charter
of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal
Justice System” (2008) 40 SCLR (2d) 655; Amar Khoday, “Ending the Erasure?: Writing
Race into the Story of Psychological Detentions–Examining R. v. Le” (2021) 100 SCLR (2d)
165 at 169-72.
11. For examples of such scholarship, see Eric M Adams, “Errors of Fact and Law: Race,
Space, and Hockey in Christie v York” (2012) 62 UTLJ 463; Constance Backhouse,
Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in Canada 1900–1950 (University of Toronto Press
for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1999) [Backhouse, Colour-Coded];
Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada From Slavery to the Present
(Fernwood, 2017); Clayton James Mosher, Discrimination and Denial: Systemic Racism in
Ontario’s Legal and Criminal Justice Systems, 1892–1961 (University of Toronto Press, 1998);
Esmeralda MA Thornhill, “So Seldom For Us, So Often Against Us: Blacks and Law in
Canada” (2008) 38 J Black Studies 321; Barrington Walker, Race on Trial: Black Defendants
in Ontario’s Criminal Courts, 1858–1958 (University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2010); James W St G Walker, “Race,” Rights and the Law
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valuable contributions, there continues to be ample room for more academic
engagement with our legal histories and the involvement that racism and racists
have played in them. One need not go back too far in time. Objects in our
historical mirror may be closer than they appear.
In this vein, and drawing from critical race theory, this article will examine
the factual and racialized context of Smithers v The Queen (Smithers), a unanimous
1977 Supreme Court of Canada decision authored by Justice Brian Dickson (as
he then was).12 During a 1974 trial, an all-white jury convicted Paul Douglas
Smithers of unlawful act manslaughter in connection with the death of Barrie
Ross Cobby. Smithers is the son of a Black father and white mother (Donald and
Joyce Smithers). Though Smithers is biracial, the Court identified him as Black,
and certainly he was verbally and physically attacked because of his Blackness.
Cobby was white and the son of two British-born immigrant parents (Leonard
and Brenda Cobby). Smithers and Cobby were both sixteen years old at the
time of Cobby’s death. The case is read annually in criminal law courses across
Canada as part of a suite of judgments that illustrate, among other things, the
legal standard for proving legal causation in homicide cases.13 In undertaking
a legal history of this decision, my goal will be to excavate the traumatic racial
violence perpetrated against Smithers by various actors, including the deceased.
When one reads the Court’s interpretation of the facts from the case and the
decision as a whole, one might be forgiven for failing to notice or remember the
role that racism played in the events leading to Cobby’s death. For this, I argue,
the Court bears significant responsibility.
In order to situate the reader, I furnish the facts as presented in the decision
now. I later provide a counter-narrative and legal history that challenges this
account. The portion that follows the ellipses in the passage quoted below appears
later in the decision (in connection with the Court’s dismissal of the claim of
self-defence), but it provides critical insight into the Court’s perception of what
took place and its construction of Smithers and Cobby as participants:
On February 18, 1973 a hockey game was played between the Applewood Midget
Team and the Cooksville Midget Team at the Cawthra Park Arena in the Town of
Mississauga. The leading player on the Applewood team was the deceased, Barrie
Cobby, sixteen years of age; the leading player on the Cooksville team was the
appellant. The game was rough, the players were aggressive and feelings ran high. The

in the Supreme Court of Canada: Historical Case Studies (The Osgoode Society for Canadian
Legal History & Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1997).
12. [1978] 1 SCR 506 [Smithers].
13. See R v Harbottle, [1993] 3 SCR 306; R v Nette, 2001 SCC 78; R v Maybin, 2012 SCC 24.
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appellant, who is black, was subjected to racial insults by Cobby and other members
of the Applewood team. Following a heated and abusive exchange of profanities,
the appellant and Cobby were both ejected from the game. The appellant made
repeated threats that he was going to “get” Cobby. Cobby was very apprehensive and
left the arena at the end of the game, some forty-five minutes later, accompanied by
eight or ten persons including friends, players, his coach and the team’s manager.
The appellant repeated his threats and challenges to fight as the group departed.
Cobby did not take up the challenge. Instead, he hurried toward a waiting car. The
appellant caught up with him at the bottom of the outside steps and directed one or
two punches to Cobby’s head. Several of Cobby’s team mates grabbed the appellant
and held him. Cobby, who had taken no steps to defend himself, was observed to
double up and stand back while the appellant struggled to free himself from those
holding him. While Cobby was thus bent over, and approximately two to four feet
from the appellant, the appellant delivered what was described as a hard, fast kick
to Cobby’s stomach area. Only seconds elapsed between the punching and the kick.
Following the kick, Cobby groaned, staggered towards his car, fell to the ground on
his back, and gasped for air. Within five minutes he appeared to stop breathing. He
was dead upon arrival at the Mississauga General Hospital.
…
Although undoubtedly much upset by the actions and language of Cobby during
the first ten minutes of play, thereafter the appellant alone was the aggressor. He
relentlessly pursued Cobby some forty-five minutes later for the purpose of carrying
out his threats to “get” Cobby.14

In this article, I shall demonstrate that the Smithers decision presented a rather
succinct, but altogether uncomplicated and largely one-sided narrative regarding
what transpired, including the fight that led to Cobby’s untimely death. As can
be understood from the excerpt above, the Court acknowledged only once in its
judgment, and summarily, that Smithers was subjected to racial insults. In doing
so, the Court drastically understated and omitted the significant role that racism
played in provoking Smithers to confront Cobby. This is striking, especially given
that Smithers is a decision that focuses notionally on the theme of causation.
To the extent that the Court even barely recognized the racism to which Smithers
was subjected, this reality was functionally offset by its construction of Smithers
and the broader narrative. Through its interpretation of what transpired and, just
as critically, its omissions from that story, the Court painted Smithers as a Black
“aggressor” who stalked his (white) prey for some forty-five minutes. It is Cobby
who is portrayed effectively as the sympathetic, youthful, white victim who

14. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508-09, 522.
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purportedly sought to avoid a physical confrontation but was relentlessly pursued
by an incensed Black male: Smithers.
Through this article, I shall argue that issues of race permeated various
aspects of the Smithers case, including the Court’s account of what transpired,
the manner in which the Crown prosecutors at trial minimized the role of racism
and its impact on Smithers, and concerns about racial bias with respect to at
least one juror. In Part II, below, I offer a more complex history of the case and
a counter-narrative of the events leading up to Cobby’s death—an account that
challenges the Court’s rendition. This shall include an alternative narrative of the
fight itself as seen primarily through the eyes of Smithers and revealed during his
trial testimony. As the case is taught annually in law school, one of my objectives
is to encourage scrutiny regarding the facts we receive from appellate judgments.
Presenting a counter-story that highlights Smithers’s account of what transpired
would not necessarily have changed the outcome of the Court’s decision. This is
especially the case in Smithers, where a jury preferred the Crown’s evidence and
concluded Smithers’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.15 That said, in Part IV,
below, I identify reasons to consider that one or more jurors were racially biased.
Another purpose in undertaking this study is to humanize Smithers, who
is perpetually vilified through the Court’s prose. To be clear, my goal is not to
beatify Smithers, but rather to contextualize and understand his actions as a victim
of racial aggression. Through this counter-narrative, I shall also demonstrate
that the deceased, while clearly not deserving of death, was no mere victim.
Rather, Cobby was a racial antagonist whose conduct contributed significantly
to Smithers’s determination to confront him regarding his racism during the
hockey game and subsequent reluctance to apologize.16 In purposely omitting a
more nuanced account and portraying Smithers as a Black aggressor, the Court
effectively (even if unintentionally) legitimized a white supremacist account of the
events. Generally, white supremacy has been explained as “a political, economic,
and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material
15. For instance, on the matter of legal causation, which is the primary reason the case is
included in Canadian criminal law textbooks, the Court stated, “[I]t may shortly be said that
there was a very substantial body of evidence, both expert and lay, before the jury indicating
that the kick [delivered by Smithers] was at least a contributing cause of death, outside the
de minimis range, and that is all that the Crown was required to establish.” Smithers, supra
note 12 at 519. Thus, even if the Court constructed a more comprehensive narrative, the
testimony of Crown witnesses provided sufficient evidence, which, if believed, could sustain a
finding for legal causation.
16. I should add that had he lived, Cobby might have matured, reflected on his racist attitudes,
and looked back at his behaviour toward Smithers with deep regret.
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resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement
are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white subordination
are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings.”17
By simultaneously purging Smithers’s account and those of defence witnesses
from the official narrative, the Court furthered a tale that accentuated Cobby’s
victimhood as a young white male, while largely concealing the racist aggression
Smithers endured at the hands of white players and spectators, alongside the
neglect of white hockey officials who failed to intervene. In so doing, I contend
that the Court devalued Smithers’s voice as a Black person fighting against the
racism he was subjected to. By re-inscribing Smithers’s subjectivity through a
counter-narrative, I argue that Smithers engaged in acts of resistance, however
imperfect, tragic, and unintended in their outcome, to the anti-Black racism that
plagued him and the systemic nature that allowed it to persist. Smithers was both
a victim of white supremacy and someone who resisted it. This was a narrative
that was left out of the Court’s decision.
In order to present a counter-narrative that in many ways inverts the Court’s
account, I draw on official and unofficial sources, including those available to
the Court. With respect to official sources, I rely on a specific portion of the
original trial transcript and the parties’ factums. The trial transcript consisted of
five volumes, of which volume four comprised the direct and cross-examination
of defence witnesses, including Smithers. Given that the Court’s interpretation
of events already reflects a prosecution-friendly perspective that was clearly
more sympathetic to Cobby, my goal here, drawing from critical race theory,
is to offer a historical counter-narrative based principally on volume four of
the trial transcript. In addition, I rely on numerous newspaper articles written
during the 1970s, including those published in The Toronto Star, The Globe and
Mail, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. Some of these articles were
contemporaneous to the trial that occurred in April 1974, while others were
published following the trial and as the case was being appealed to the Court
of Appeal for Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada. In the post-trial
articles, Smithers and other individuals familiar with the case gave interviews and
offered perspectives which reinforced or, in some circumstances, drew attention
to facets which may not have been present or apparent in the official sources
17. Cheryl I Harris, “Whiteness as Property” (1993) 106 Harv L Rev 1707 at 1714, n 10,
citing Frances Lee Ansley, “Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship” (1989) 74 Cornell L Rev 993 at 1024, n 129. Interestingly, Ibram X Kendi
explains how white supremacy often works to the detriment of white people in a variety of
ways. See How to Be an Antiracist (One World, 2019) at 131-32.
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mentioned above. These include concerns related to allegedly racist attitudes held
by one or more jury members that prompted Smithers’s appellate counsel Roy
McMurtry, in 1975, to seek federal ministerial review of the decision to convict
Smithers at trial.
This article tells a story concerning overt acts of anti-Black racism. The
narrative includes the utterance of vile and destructive words synonymous with
such discrimination. As a person of colour who is not Black, I do not claim any
license to employ such racist terms in an unrestricted manner. When not quoting
from sources, and in instances where I refer generally to the most common and
destructive anti-Black racist slur, I shall employ the surrogate term “n-word”
rather than the full word that it signifies. However, when citing to publications in
the footnotes that employ racial slurs in the titles, I have retained the unredacted
words to account for the sources accurately.
In telling the broader story of racism in the Smithers case, I have incorporated
numerous statements by individuals who are Black, especially Smithers, and who,
when speaking of their experiences of racism, employed the actual racist terms
to explain what was said to them as well as the terms’ damaging effects. When
quoting such statements, I have chosen to reproduce the racist slurs in a redacted
form by encapsulating them in square brackets with asterisks as substitutes for
certain letters. I should briefly explain why I have incorporated quotations with
racial slurs in this article at all, albeit in redacted form. First, including the racist
language found in the original texts maintains fidelity to the historical record
located in the trial transcripts, parties’ factums, and newspaper accounts. Second,
documenting such language shines a light on the reality and violence of overt
anti-Black racism, which in the Smithers case was also an implicit assertion of
white supremacy.18 Third, most of the statements quoted below that employ the
use of racist terms were made by Black individuals themselves while sharing their
experiences of when such slurs were deployed against them or others. I am loath
to censor their words in an article that seeks to value Black voices and Black
people’s experiences of racism.
Given these stated reasons, some readers might find it odd that I would
employ redacted forms of these racial slurs, especially when quoting from primary
sources. I offer a few explanations for this. The sheer quantity of times that the
n-word appears in the history of this case is far from scarce. While not all readers,
18. Anti-Black racism is not an epidemic isolated to white supremacy. Negative and destructive
attitudes about Black persons are shared among other people of colour, including Asians.
See e.g. Maya Prabhu, “African victims of racism in India share their stories” (3 May 2017),
online: Al Jazeera <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/african-victims-racismindia-share-stories-170423093250637.html>.
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including those who are Black, may find reading the unredacted racial slurs
upsetting and triggering within the context of this article, others surely might for
a host of legitimate reasons. This may prove to be a barrier to engaging with the
article. Although the unabridged version of the n-word appears in a great deal of
legal scholarship by Black authors from the United States,19 it is not as common
a practice in Canadian legal scholarship to use it and certainly not as extensively
in any one single article.20 Employing a redacted form of particular racist terms
when quoting from primary sources still allows readers to fully understand what
was said to Smithers and the terms’ impact on him, while maintaining fidelity
to the original texts in which these words appear and their readability. I have not
replaced the original words with entirely different words, which would indeed
be falsifying the record. In my respectful view, using redacted versions of the
racial slurs when quoting source material is a reasonable approach. It seeks to
avoid the harm that quoting the full and unabridged racist terms would cause to
some readers, while steering away from sanitizing the account by excluding such
language altogether, which would replicate the Court’s approach. It is not enough
to just state that racial slurs were directed at Smithers and to cite the relevant
sources that corroborate this reality. As with all storytelling, it is important to
show and not just tell about the racism Smithers was subjected to.
This article is divided into four main parts followed by a conclusion. Part
I situates this article within several scholarly and intellectual frameworks,
including critical race theory and Canadian legal history and historiography
regarding race. Part II of this article presents a more robust counter-story of
what occurred in the Smithers case that draws upon, from the official sources
discussed above, the largely missing perspectives of Smithers and other defence
witnesses. This counter-narrative will, in effect, not only reveal information that
was excluded from the Court’s narrative but will also serve as an inversion of the
roles that Smithers and Cobby played in the official account. Part III focuses
attention to how the prosecution’s theory of the case and the statements of the
prosecutors minimized the pivotal role that racism played in the events leading
to Cobby’s death, as well as the impact of such racism on Smithers as the victim
19. See e.g. Michele Goodwin, “Nigger and the Construction of Citizenship” (2003) 76 Temp L
Rev 129; Gregory S Parks & Shayne E Jones, ““Nigger”: A Critical Race Realist Analysis of
the N-Word within Hate Crimes Law” (2008) 98 J Crim L & Criminology 1305; Darryll M
Halcomb Lewis, “The Creation of a Hostile Work Environment by a Workplace Supervisor’s
Single Use of the Epithet Nigger” (2016) 53 Am Bus LJ 383.
20. I conducted a search of Canadian law articles in Westlaw’s database using the unabridged
version of the n-word. This search turned up roughly thirty articles. Among those, the
unabridged version of the n-word appears typically only a few times.
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of that prejudice. Part IV then redirects the reader to concerns relating to how
racism may have played a role in at least one juror’s decision making, affecting
the fairness of the trial.

I. SITUATING THIS HISTORY
The Smithers case is rooted in racism and in the attempt to challenge such
discrimination. In telling a different account, I have drawn on several
interconnected forms of scholarship and intellectual frameworks and situate this
article within such discourse. Part I(A) explains and places this work within the
framework of critical race scholarship, its emphasis on the systemic and regularized
nature of racism, and its use of counter-storytelling as an instrument to challenge
official or mainstream narratives. Part I(B) locates this article within the broader
scholarship on race and Canadian legal history. In Part I(C), I discuss writings
concerning the damaging nature of racial slurs and their impact on Black hockey
players in particular. Part I(D) positions this article within the social history of
Black resistance to racial oppression. In Part I(E), I consider scholarship on judicial
narratives and storytelling, with a focus on fact construction by appellate courts.
A. CRITICAL RACE THEORY

During the late twentieth century, critical race theory (CRT) first emerged
as an intellectual response to the notion of colour-blindness in the context
of institutional struggles regarding the scope of equality and the content of
American legal education.21 Despite its origins in the legal academy, scholars in
various other disciplines, as well as those who are based outside the United States
(including in Canada), have come to adopt and consider CRT as a central feature
of their work. While there is much diversity among critical race scholars, it may
be said that there are some basic and common understandings or approaches that
constitute this scholarship. I focus on two of these that are relevant to this article.
First, as Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic assert, one such shared
understanding is that racism is “ordinary, not aberrational.”22 Indeed, racism
21. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “Unmasking Colorblindness in the Law: Lessons from the
Formation of Critical Race Theory” in Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw et al, eds, Seeing Race
Again: Countering Colorblindness Across the Disciplines (University of California Press, 2019)
52 at 52. Though the history and development of CRT is beyond the scope of this article, see
also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, “The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or ‘A Foot in the
Closing Door’” (2002) 49 UCLA L Rev 1343.
22. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction 2nd (New York University Press, 2012) at 7 [Delgado &
Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction].
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is systemic and widespread, rather than consisting of episodic and isolated
phenomena. Given racism’s systemic nature, CRT can provide an especially
important lens when examining criminal law, criminal justice, and systemic
racism.23 This can extend to the manner in which racialized groups are viewed
and constructed as dangerous or threatening, and thus subjected to significant
policing and heightened scrutiny.24 Examined through a critical race lens,
there is legitimate skepticism about the roles of the adversarial system or juries
as guarantors of racial justice, given the realities of systemic racism and the
over-policing of racialized communities.25 Drawing on CRT, Kelsey L. Sitar
has argued for a greater appreciation of race and racialization within various
aspects of Canadian criminal trial processes.26 Specifically, Sitar posits that
considerations of racial profiling and over-policing should factor into judicial
determinations of applications arising under the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms27 concerning the constitutionality of particular police detentions,
vehicle stops, search and seizure issues, and the exclusion of evidence.28 Despite
law’s preoccupation with race neutrality and colour-blindness in various spheres,
policing does not occur in a social vacuum.
A second common feature of critical race scholarship has been to expose
various ignored or alternative realities concerning people of colour. Critical race
scholars articulate that “whiteness is…normative; it sets the standards in dozens
of situations.”29 By contrast, people belonging to racialized groups may simply be
characterized or defined by their non-whiteness without any sufficient regard for
their experiences. Given their alterity, minorities can appear in various narratives,
including in court cases and popular culture, as villains or oversexed subjects.30
Critical race scholars have sought to inscribe such alternative or ignored
realities through diverse means. They have written “personal histories, parables…

23. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, “Critical Race Theory and Criminal Justice” (2007)
31 Humanity & Society 133.
24. Ibid at 140.
25. Ibid at 141.
26. “Gladue as a Sword: Incorporating Critical Race Perspectives into the Canadian Criminal
Trial” (2016) 20 Can Crim L Rev 247 at 248.
27. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(UK), 1982, c 11.
28. Sitar, supra note 26 at 254-62.
29. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 84.
30. Ibid.
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poetry, fiction…revisionist histories,”31 and “counterstories,” as well as
“investigated the factual background and personalities, frequently ignored in the
casebooks, of well-known cases.”32 As noted above, examining and advancing
alternative narratives to mainstream accounts of the lives and experiences of
racialized persons and communities is important since many “members of [a]
country’s dominant racial group,” who in turn often comprise institutions of
power, “cannot easily grasp what it is like to be nonwhite [sic].”33 Many white and
non-white members of society in the global north may subscribe to what Daniel
Solórzano and Tara Yosso refer to as a “majoritarian story,” which, among other
things, “distorts and silences the experiences of people of colour.”34
Counter-storytelling can shed light on the lived experiences of people of colour,
which are elided or treated with insufficient sensitivity in official narratives.35
Solórzano and Yosso define a counter-story as “a method of telling the stories of
those people whose experiences are not often told,”36 and as “a tool for exposing,
analyzing, and challenging the majoritarian stories of racial privilege” that may
be silent on race.37 Counter-storytelling is important because, as Delgado and
Stefancic remind us, “People of different races have radically different experiences
as they go through life.”38 While individuals occupy certain normative universes
from which they may be difficult to dislodge, “well-told stories describing the
realit[ies]” of the lives of racialized persons can assist readers (or receivers) of
these narratives to “bridge the gap between their worlds…and others.”39 Telling
counter-stories is important for challenging myths and preconceptions in legal
discourse. Delgado and Stefancic argue that “preconceptions and myths, for
example about black criminality or Muslim terrorism, shape mind-set.”40 They
articulate that a “mind-set” is in turn understood as the “bundle of received
31. Charles R Lawrence III et al, “Introduction” in Mari J Matsuda et al, eds, Words that
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (Westview
Press, 1993) 1 at 5.
32. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 44.
33. Ibid at 45. See also Russell K Robinson, “Perceptual Segregation” (2008) 108
Colum L Rev 1093.
34. “Critical Race Methodology: Counter-Storytelling as an Analytical Framework for Education
Research” (2002) 8 Qualitative Inquiry 23 at 29.
35. See Joshua Sealy-Harrington, “Untelling the Story of Race,” The Walrus (15 July 2020),
online: <thewalrus.ca/untelling-the-story-of-race>.
36. Solórzano & Yosso, supra note 34 at 32.
37. Ibid.
38. Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 47.
39. Ibid at 47-48.
40. Ibid at 49.
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wisdoms, stock stories, and suppositions that allocate suspicion, place the burden
of proof on one party or the other, and tell us in cases of divided evidence
what probably happened.”41 Critical race writers can play a key role in using
counter-stories to engage in resistance42 and “to challenge, displace, or mock
these pernicious narratives and beliefs.”43
Solórzano and Yosso identify that there are, generally, at least three types
of counter-narratives.44 The first type focuses on personal stories that are
autobiographical in nature and explore forms of racism and sexism experienced
by people of colour.45 The second type is more biographical in nature; they narrate
other people’s stories, are told in the third person voice, and discuss experiences
of racism and sexism in a sociohistorical context.46 The last type centers on
composite stories or narratives that “draw on various forms of ‘data’ to recount
the racialized, sexualized, and classed experiences of people of color.”47 This third
category may provide both “autobiographical and biographical analyses because
the authors create composite characters and place them in social, historical,
and political situations to discuss racism, sexism, classism, and other forms of
subordination.”48
As I undertake in this article, applying a critical race lens is vital when
examining the historical record in criminal cases where race has largely been
sidelined and where racialized individuals may be cast in certain roles. Drawing
from CRT, my approach to counter-narrating the Smithers decision combines a
revisionist approach to the legal history of this case with the second category that
Solórzano and Yosso explain, which depicts another person’s experiences with
racism. In telling a counter-narrative of the Smithers case, I shall illustrate the
normalized manner in which racism was aimed at Smithers, particularly during
his time playing hockey. Such experiences were defined by his Blackness, which
was also notably identified in the Court’s judgment. By marking Smithers as an
aggressor seeking to “get” Cobby for forty-five minutes, the Court cast him in the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Ibid.
Solórzano & Yosso, supra note 34 at 32.
Delgado & Stefancic, CRT: An Introduction, supra note 22 at 49.
Solórzano & Yosso, supra note 34 at 32.
Ibid at 32-33.
Ibid at 33.
Ibid.
Ibid. For an insightful Canadian-situated example of this form of composite
counter-storytelling, see Kanika Samuels-Wortley, “To Serve and Protect Whom? Using
Composite Counter-Storytelling to Explore Black and Indigenous Youth Experiences and
Perceptions of the Police in Canada” (2021) 67 Crime & Delinquency 1137.
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role of the Black villain. Through the counter-narrative in Part II below, I hope to
shed light on the lived experience of a racialized teenager who endured repeated
and socially tolerated racial abuse, and to counter and invert the Court’s official
narrative, which is read annually by students of law.
B. RACE, LAW, AND CANADIAN HISTORY – SETTING THE HISTORICAL AND
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SCENE

Despite many Canadians’ romantic image of their nation and society as open
and accepting,49 both historically and in our present context, this has hardly
been everyone’s experience.50 As law is a reflection of broader cultural values,
it has been misused as a tool for advancing racial ideologies, exclusion, and
mistreatment. Various legal and socio-legal scholars have examined themes of race
and racial discrimination through the law in Canadian society. Notably, among
the scholarship written about race and legal history in Canada, the Smithers case
does not seem to have captured any real attention.51 This is likely because the
judgment is focused largely on the matter of causation and other legal issues.
Regardless of the sheer abundance of evidence in the trial record concerning the
racism that was directed at Smithers and its role in the events leading to Cobby’s
demise, this discrimination was omitted from the Court’s decision but for a single
sentence. The racial dimensions of this case have been substantially overlooked.
Thus, a scholarly examination of the racial characteristics of the Smithers case has
been absent from the rich body of work on race and Canadian legal history. This
article seeks to address that lacuna.
In recent decades, there has been significant work on the intersection of race
and the law within a historical framework. For instance, Constance Backhouse
has written about the legal history of racism in Canada. In one monograph,
she examines the period covering 1900 to 1950 and highlights key instances
of discrimination directed at Indigenous people, Black people, and people of
colour in Canada. Through her work, Backhouse aims to document the “central
role of the Canadian legal system in the establishment and enforcement of racial
49. J Walker, supra note 11 (“Canadians perceive themselves to be tolerant of racial and cultural
diversity, to possess a history of equal treatment towards all, to have avoided the syndrome of
racism so evident south of the border” at 3).
50. See Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11 at 7. Backhouse asserts, “To fail to scrutinize the
records of our past to identify the deeply implanted tenets of racist ideology and practice is
to acquiesce in the popular misapprehension that depicts our country as largely innocent of
systemic racial exploitation. Nothing could be more patently erroneous.”
51. Though in fairness to several scholars, some of their studies were temporally limited to
periods that culminated before the events of the Smithers case transpired.
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inequality.”52 She adds that the “Canadian legal system played a principal and
dominant role in creating and preserving racial discrimination. Racism is a
deeply embedded, archly defining characteristic of Canadian history.”53 In other
work, Backhouse observes that, in many decisions, judges have failed to account
for the racial identities of the actors involved in the events, even where cases
revolved around arguments of racism.54 Even where visible minorities may be
given a racial designation, white actors in these cases can remain raceless.55
Backhouse posits, “To the individuals involved in real cases, however, race can
be the critical variable underlying the actual dispute.”56 As the discussion in Parts
II–IV, below, illustrates, race was a critical aspect of the Smithers case but was
largely ignored by the Court.
In addition to Backhouse, several scholars and writers have examined,
specifically, the historical experience of Black Canadians in the Canadian criminal
justice system.57 Such work has salience to the Smithers case. In one study,
Barrington Walker focuses particularly on the treatment of Black defendants in
Ontario between 1858–1958.58 He writes that the experience of many Black
people was one of social exclusion and marginality with respect to places of
employment, places where they could reside, schools they could attend, and spaces
where they could worship.59 This extended to involvement in sports. Walker and
other authors have shown that this racist exclusion was predicated on perceptions
of Black inferiority and criminality, which infected the criminal justice system
resulting in unequal treatment.60 Such notions impacted assessments of liability

52. Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11 at 15.
53. Ibid at 17.
54. Constance Backhouse, “Bias in Canadian Law: A Lopsided Precipice,” in R v RDS:
An Editor’s Forum, Case Comment, (1998) 10 CJWL 170 at 171-72 [Backhouse, “Bias in
Canadian Law”]. This is, of course, not always the case, and some courts have been more
sanguine in recent decades about the existence of racism and its impact in the criminal justice
system. See e.g. Parks, supra note 10 at 369.
55. Backhouse, “Bias in Canadian Law,” supra note 54 at 170-72.
56. Ibid at 172.
57. See Adams, supra note 11; Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11; Maynard, supra
note 11; Mosher, supra note 11; Thornhill, supra note 11; B Walker, supra note 11;
J Walker, supra note 11.
58. See B Walker, supra note 11.
59. Ibid at 3.
60. See e.g. ibid at 20-21, 45-88, 123-31; Maynard, supra note 11 at 83-115; Mosher, supra note
11 at 129-34, 170-74.
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and punishment, particularly when the victims were white.61 Tropes regarding the
assumed inferiority of Black men have also been employed by defence counsel as
mitigating circumstances; emphasis might be placed on the purported childlike
qualities of Black defendants.62
There have been struggles with respect to documenting the history of Black
Canadians through criminal law jurisprudence. As a historian, Barrington
Walker reflects on such difficulties based on criminal case files, which can present
methodological challenges common to all historians. Specifically, such “challenges
stem from the well-known concerns about the fragmentary nature of case files and
the difficulty of recovering muted voices of marginalized populations through
documents created by elites.”63 He further contends, “The major challenge when
one is confronted with researching the history of race on trial in a racial liberal
order where colour-blindness is an integral part of legal formalism is the initial
step of finding cases involving Black defendants.”64
Fortunately, such difficulties are not present in Smithers. The Court’s own
judgment was not entirely colour-blind; Smithers was specifically labelled as
Black, while Cobby’s race was not identified, though likely presumed as white.
Furthermore, the wider case record, including the appellant’s factum and the
trial transcripts, provide a fuller, deeper, and more disturbing account pertaining
to the role of racism in the case. Although the voices of Black defendants may
have been muted in numerous other cases, perhaps in part because the accused
never testified, this was not the case here. Smithers not only took the witness
stand at his trial but also gave interviews to several journalists following the
trial’s completion. He spoke about his experiences during hockey games and
the need to confront the racism he faced. Thus, the source material available in
the Smithers case, which appears in no way fragmentary, permits a deeper legal
historical examination of the case and its situated status in the history of race and
the law in Canada.

61. See Mosher, supra note 11 at 194-95. Mosher states, “These interracial crimes were perceived
as particularly problematic by court officials, and judges confirmed their disdain for those
who crossed racial lines by invoking the full weight of the law by imposing corporal
punishment on such offenders and by sentencing them to lengthy terms of incarceration.”
62. See B Walker, supra note 11 at 72.
63. Ibid at 12.
64. Ibid at 13.
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C. THE “N-WORD,” HOCKEY, AND THE IMPACT OF RACIAL INSULTS

At a general level, racial insults have a damaging impact upon their recipients.
Richard Delgado posits that the “racial insult remains one of the most pervasive
channels through which discriminatory attitudes are imparted. Such language
injures the dignity and self-regard of the person to whom it is addressed,
communicating the message that distinctions of race are distinctions of merit,
dignity, status, and personhood.”65 The psychological harms caused by racial
stigmatization are often rather severe;66 furthermore, the harms caused by racism
and racial labelling may have a greater impact on children than on adults.67
Smithers was a teenager when the events in his case transpired.
More specifically, with respect to anti-Black racism, the n-word as a racist
insult has a lengthy and distressing history.68 Scholars have identified it as having an
assaultive quality capable of wounding its recipients.69 Its injurious quality comes
from certain constructed meanings. As African-American historian Elizabeth
Stordeur Pryor explains, “Fundamentally, the n-word is an idea disguised as a
word—that Black people are intellectually, biologically, and immutably inferior
to white people.”70 She adds, “[T]hat inferiority means that the injustice we suffer
and inequality we endure is essentially our own fault.”71 Pryor posits that during
the early nineteenth century in particular, the n-word developed into a slur and
weapon deployed against Black people as large numbers of Black people began
to gain freedom in the northern United States.72 She articulates that the word
became “fundamentally an assault on Black freedom, Black mobility, and Black
aspiration. Even now, nothing so swiftly unleashes an n-word tirade as a Black

65. “Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling” (1982)
17 Harv CR-CLL Rev 133 at 135-36.
66. See Roberta K Timothy, “Racism Impacts Your Health” (28 February 2018), online: The
Conversation <theconversation.com/racism-impacts-your-health-84112>; David R Williams
& Ruth Williams-Morris, “Racism and Mental Health: The African American Experience”
(2000) 5 Ethnicity & Health 243.
67. See Delgado, supra note 65 at 142-43.
68. See generally Goodwin, supra note 19; Elizabeth Stordeur Pryor, “The Etymology of Nigger:
Resistance, Language, and the Politics of Freedom in the Antebellum North” (2016) 36 J
Early Republic 203.
69. See e.g. Goodwin, supra note 19 at 193-95.
70. “Why it’s so hard to talk about the N-word” (14 December 2019)
at 00h:04min:51s, online (video): Ted Talks <www.ted.com/talks/
elizabeth_stordeur_pryor_why_it_s_so_hard_to_talk_about_the_n_word>.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid at 00h:15min:13s.
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person asserting their rights or going where they please or prospering.”73 As the
Smithers story and the stories of other Black athletes reveal, the n-word and other
slurs are used, among other reasons, to attack and undermine the desire of Black
athletes to engage in sports and to excel.
A number of (former) Black athletes have commented on the impact of the
flagrant and repeated use of racial words against them while they played hockey
professionally or in amateur settings as youths. The ruggedness that athletes in
rough sports are assumed and expected to possess offers no shield. For instance,
Toronto-based lawyer and writer Anthony Morgan has written of his experience
and reactions to being the recipient of such language at the age of ten. During a
hockey game, Morgan had managed to bump an opposing player off the puck,
and the individual reacted by saying, “You f*cking [ni***r]!!”74 He writes of his
reaction in the following way:
My heart just shattered. I stopped skating, and quickly turned around to look back
at the player in disbelief and confusion. I could find no words and could barely
breathe.
We were just 10 years old, but in the moment that our eyes met, I saw a meanness
that was so overwhelmingly venomous and disempowering that I just burst into
tears right there on the ice. This was the only response I could muster. I had never
felt so alone, so helpless, so worthless, so hurt, so ashamed, so lost.75

Morgan’s poignant recounting of this event illustrates the devastation and sense
of isolation that a racial insult can inflict. Various (former) Black professional
hockey players have shared their experiences with racism while playing hockey
as teenagers.76 Such racism did not merely emanate from rival players,77 but also
from coaches and spectators. As former National Hockey League (NHL) player
Georges Laraque remembers:
The kids were calling me [‘ni***r’], the coaches were calling me [‘ni***r’], the parents
in the stands were calling me [‘ni***r’]. It was unbelievable. I cried a lot when I was

73. Ibid at 00h:16min:23s.
74. Anthony Morgan, “Hockey was my game” (29 November 2019), online: Ricochet <ricochet.
media/en/2833/hockey-was-my-game>.
75. Ibid.
76. See Cecil Harris, Breaking the Ice: The Black Experience in Professional Hockey
(Insomniac Press, 2003).
77. In some cases, the racial hostility emanates from one’s own teammates. See Akim Aliu,
“Hockey Is Not for Everyone” (19 May 2020), online: The Players’ Tribune <www.
theplayerstribune.com/en-us/articles/hockey-is-not-for-everyone-akim-aliu-nhl>.
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a kid. Not that I would cry in front of the other kids because I had a lot of ego. But
I would go home and cry.78

Morgan and Laraque’s experiences were not unique.
The distressing impact of being called the n-word affects adult Black hockey
players as well as their younger counterparts. Michael Marson was the second
Black person to play in the NHL and was recruited by the Washington Capitols
in 1974 when he was eighteen years old.79 Marson was born on 24 July 1955
and was one year older than Smithers.80 Marson played in the Ontario Hockey
League prior to joining the NHL.81 He and a fellow Black teammate, Bill Riley,
were subjected to a continuous cacophony of racial abuse.82 Riley, who was
Marson’s senior, commented that the constant racism and use of racial epithets
impacted Marson greatly. Riley observed that
in the NHL, the stuff Michael had to deal with as a kid kind of destroyed him.
We got called every dirty name in the book, and we were getting high-sticked and
slashed and speared on the ice. We would both fight back, but those things just cut
Michael’s heart out.83

African-American sportswriter and independent journalist Cecil Harris has
written about Black men’s experiences playing in professional hockey. While
racism was not the only theme touched upon in Harris’s book, it was a significant
and recurring experience for many Black hockey players originating from Canada.
Despite the successes many players may have had, Harris observes the following:
[N]o amount of positive reinforcement can totally erase the pain of a [B]lack
person subjected to a racial slur, particularly one uttered by someone in a position
of authority, someone who could affect your quality of life. The slur is an attack on
one’s personhood, an attempt to damage the psyche and wound the soul. And for a
[B]lack in the overwhelmingly white world of hockey, no slur cuts deeper and instills
more pain than “[ni***r].84

78. C Harris, supra note 76 at 106.
79. Ibid at 57-63; Ben Raby, “Against the Odds: Remembering Mike Marson’s Career with
the Caps” (25 February 2019), online: Washington Capitols <www.nhl.com/capitals/news/
against-the-odds-remembering-mike-marsons-career-with-the-caps/c-305201080>.
80. C Harris, supra note 76 at 63.
81. Ibid at 62-63.
82. Ibid at 65-67.
83. Ibid at 67.
84. Ibid at 149.
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As Smithers posited in an interview in 1975, being called the n-word is “the most
degrading thing anybody can call me, but I guess I’m just supposed to take it.”85
In a more recent interview, Smithers (now in his early sixties) articulated, “I can’t
express to you the humiliation you feel when somebody calls you those names….
You just want to hide. You just want to crawl under a table and not be seen.”86
A full accounting of the racism experienced by professional and amateur
Black hockey players is beyond the scope of this article.87 It should be fairly well
understood that instances of anti-Black racism are not confined to hockey or
other sports. The purpose of this section is to identify the impact and emotional
consequences of hurling racial slurs at young Black athletes, which will help to
frame Smithers’s actions in response to Cobby’s racist violence—both verbal and
physical. First, there is a particularly destructive quality to the n-word and other
similar slurs largely reserved for Black people. Second, when these slurs are hurled
in the context of organized sports, Black athletes sustain emotional damage. The
use of such racist words is demeaning enough on its own; however, in the context
of hockey, these words are also accompanied by physically violent actions.
When Smithers was playing, he too was subjected to racist words, accompanied
sometimes by physical violence directed his way. The impact of these racist words,
over time, in combination with the failure of officials to respond appropriately to
such racism, must be understood to contextualize Smithers’s resistance to these
words. The Court failed to recognize such realities and largely erased them from
its narrative.
D. CONFRONTING RACISM AS AN ACT OF RESISTANCE

Though racism and its pernicious impacts have been considerable features
throughout Canadian history and that of other nations, many people of colour
have resisted discriminatory oppression through legal actions and, in other
85. David DuPree, “Racial Taunts, Hockey Violence—Death is the Aftermath: Manslaughter
Conviction Follows Death of Hockey Player,” The Washington Post (1 March 1975) C1 at C5.
86. Dave Feschuk, “The cost of words: It was almost 50 years ago when a night of slurs at the
hockey rink led to a teenager’s death,” The Toronto Star (13 June 2020), online: <www.
thestar.com/sports/hockey/opinion/2020/06/13/the-cost-of-words-it-was-almost-50-yearsago-when-a-night-of-slurs-at-the-hockey-rink-led-to-a-teenagers-death.html>. See also CBC
News, “Racial slurs changed the life of Paul Smithers in 1973, but he still hopes for change”
(12 June 2020), online (video): <www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCVJkHWsito>.
87. Though it should be noted that concerns about the continued utterance of
racial slurs persist today in minor league hockey in Toronto. See Rick Westhead
& Solarina Ho, “Racial slurs are common in Toronto-area minor hockey
league, players say” (6 June 2020), online: CTV News <www.ctvnews.ca/sports/
racial-slurs-are-common-in-toronto-area-minor-hockey-league-players-say-1.4972991>.
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situations, via extra-legal means. James W. St.G. Walker asserts, “Minority
resistance challenged the hegemony of the prevailing paradigm and revealed the
presence of multiple historical trajectories within Canadian society.”88 He observes
that “minority resistance did not begin with World War II”; rather, “it was
carried frequently before the majority population in petitions and delegations to
legislatures, newspaper campaigns, action in the workplace, and testing through
the courts.”89 As further evidence of this, Barrington Walker has illustrated
how Black North Americans resisted slavery, racially charged insults hurled by
white people, and other illegitimate race-related conduct perpetrated by state
and non-state actors.90 Backhouse has highlighted Viola Desmond’s challenge to
racial segregation in 1940s Nova Scotia.91 Therefore, while Black Canadians are
and have been targets of racial discrimination, James Walker posits that a broader
social history recognizes that persons from minorities were “actively engaged, not
as victims or objects, but as participants in the shaping of their own destinies.”92
Though it should be noted, such resistance bore mixed results. Some fought the
law, but the law won.
It is in this broader socio-legal and historical context that I shall situate
Smithers’s actions against white supremacist attitudes and behaviour, which were
dominant in hockey at that time; this is a counter-story to the Court’s official
narrative. Smithers’s resistance did not reveal itself as genteel opposition to the
racism he experienced from opposing players or spectators, or to the tolerance
of racism by officials at the time. Smithers was confrontational and justifiably
indignant. Though he was clearly a victim of racial aggression and experienced
its impacts, he did not suffer the racism he endured as a passive victim. Smithers
demonstrated agency. He challenged prevailing social prescriptions, founded
in white supremacy, that he should simply endure his abusers’ racism and
violence. However, his resistance had certain unintended and unforeseeable
consequences—the death of Cobby.
E.

JUDICIAL NARRATIVES AND STORYTELLING

This article is also concerned with fact construction and dissemination in the
context of appellate decision making. During litigation, facts may be hotly
contested. However, as Eric M. Adams contends, facts assume a “final form”
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

J Walker, supra note 11 at 321.
Ibid.
B Walker, supra note 11 at 28-44.
Backhouse, Colour-Coded, supra note 11 at 226-71.
J Walker, supra note 11 at 322.
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in the written decisions of appellate courts, “ossify[ing] into something beyond
debate.”93 Apropos to this article, he posits, “In the confident prose of judges,
facts become the incontestable history of the moments they describe.”94
Adams’s article itself is about how certain facts concerning a Supreme Court of
Canada case, Christie v The York Corporation (Christie),95 found their way into
the dissenting opinion, and were patently incorrect.96 Adams argues that such
factual errors are illuminating for many reasons, not the least of which is that
they may serve as the main reason for divergent approaches between a majority
and a dissenting opinion.97 Furthermore, as Christie was a case about racial
exclusion with respect to accessing services in a tavern (during a period when
human rights codes barring racial discrimination in the obtaining of services
were non-existent), Adams articulates that the case and its factual errors tell
an important historical story about how racism functioned in urban spaces in
Canada at the time it was decided.98
Drawing from Adams, I argue that the Smithers case illuminates how, over
time, the Court’s view of the facts of a case can become the primary point of
reference. Contemporaneous to the trial (April–June 1974), and in the following
years leading up to the Court’s decision (1977), newspaper reports revealed a
broader accounting of what occurred on the evening that Cobby died, in addition
to the factual context leading up to the fateful night. Since the Court’s decision,
such news reports concerning the case have receded from the public’s attention
and memory. It is likely that what most law students have learned about the
facts in Smithers over several decades is what the Court has told us—subject to
instructors assigning more material.99 However, as Adams enquires, what if the
facts are wrong (or otherwise so utterly incomplete)? In the Smithers case, unlike
Christie, there was no dissent operating on the assumption of a different set of
facts or factual assumptions. Smithers was a unanimous judgement subscribing to
a particular interpretation of what occurred.
Following Adams’s example, I provide a broader history of what ensued in
Smithers. I hope to offer a revealing look at two ways that racism functioned in the
case. First, Smithers illustrates how racism operated and was accepted in organized
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Adams, supra note 11 at 464.
Ibid.
[1940] SCR 139 [Christie].
Adams, supra note 11 at 464-67.
Ibid at 467-68.
Ibid at 495-97.
For instance, I have assigned newspaper articles such as David DuPree’s 1975 article in the
Washington Post. See DuPree, supra note 85.
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sports at the amateur level. Second, and perhaps more alarmingly, the Court’s
bare acknowledgement of this racism and construction of Smithers as a Black
aggressor signifies its own complicity in legitimating this racism and advancing
the pernicious caricature of Black males as uncontrolled savages and criminals.
When one contemplates ideas about judicial storytelling and the selection of
which facts comprise the official narrative, one might consider Clifford Geertz’s
assertion that “legal facts are made not born” and are socially constructed in
light of various considerations including the rules of evidence, law reporting
traditions, and “the rhetoric of judges.”100 As noted earlier, Justice Brian Dickson
authored the decision on behalf of the Court. He had a recognizable approach
to writing decisions. In their biography of Justice Dickson, Robert J. Sharpe
and Kent Roach observe that his opinions, for the most part, were “short and
concise.”101 They posit that Justice Dickson was known for working very hard
to make his judgments “as clear as possible.”102 These are laudable objectives,
provided that a devotion to clarity, conciseness, and readability does not result
in oversimplification, a lack of nuance, or a one-sided account that is unfair to
a party in the case, particularly a criminal defendant. This is unfortunately what
transpired in the Smithers case.
Judicial fact construction and storytelling at the appellate level become
rather complex enterprises when cases arise out of a jury trial. In non-jury trials,
the judge, sitting as the finder of fact, provides reasons that can serve as a key
basis for appellate review.103 Any review with respect to factual errors is assessed
on a highly deferential standard.104 During a jury trial, the jurors determine what
happened and apply the law as instructed by the judge.105 The jury does not
furnish reasons.106 Even where an appellate court hears appeals from a jury trial
on questions of law or mixed fact and law, there is a factual matrix from which
the case emerges. How do appellate courts decide which facts matter, or even
what happened, when there was conflicting testimony at trial? It may be prudent
for appellate courts to at least acknowledge in their judgments that there were
conflicting accounts given at trial but that the jury clearly or likely favoured certain
evidence in arriving at its verdict. In other jury cases, both parties may arrive at
100. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (Basic Books, 1983) at 173.
101. Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey (University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History, 2003) at 116.
102. Ibid at 202.
103. David M Paciocco et al, The Law of Evidence, 8th (Irwin Law, 2020) at 25-26.
104. Le, supra note 10 at para 23.
105. Paciocco et al, supra note 103 at 25.
106. Ibid.
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an agreed set of facts from which an appellate court may draw when constructing
the factual narrative. Smithers was a jury trial. There were no written findings of
fact. While the Court was provided a broader understanding of the facts which
gave rise to Cobby’s death and the racialized context through the appellant’s
factum and specific references to the trial transcript, it largely disregarded them.
For the most part, many of the factual representations in Smithers’s appellant
factum went uncontested in the Crown’s respondent factum.107
Time plays a central role in constructing narratives. In judicial storytelling,
when does the narrative begin? An account of the past that looks solely at the
transgressive act(s) constituting the criminal offence and the moments that
preceded the offence (even assuming that the account is accurate and not unduly
one-sided) may nevertheless be impoverished if a broader and relevant contextual
understanding is omitted. Take, for instance, the case of an accused who immolates
a victim while the latter is sleeping. If evidence exists and is presented that the
accused and victim were in a one-sided violent and abusive relationship (and the
accused was at the receiving end of this abuse), should the narrative clock begin
only moments before the transgressive and murderous act of immolation?108
Such a move could be detrimental to an accused. As Tanzil Z. Chowdhury
articulates, temporality impacts “what types of facts, or specifically, what types of
pasts are emergent in [an] adjudication’s determination of what happened.”109
Chowdhury maintains that how we frame the past has consequences for ascribing
legal responsibility to an accused.110 This framing is relevant with respect to
liability, as well as sentencing and arriving at a punishment that is proportionate,
accounting for, among other things, the offender’s moral blameworthiness.
Time’s relevance with respect to the Court’s narrative in the Smithers case is
striking. The Court is chiefly focused on Smithers’s transgressive act, and the only
relevant context in which it is interested is the heated nature of the game and
Smithers’s forty-five-minute pursuit of Cobby following their ejection, both of
which precede the consequential fight in the parking lot. Even then, it drastically
understates the details of the racism and violence targeted at Smithers during the
107. Smithers v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 506 (Factum of the Respondent [Respondent’s
Factum]) (“The Respondent accepts the facts as stated by the Appellant and draws the
following additional facts to the attention of this Honourable Court” at para 1). Such
additional facts were focused largely on the medical testimony and the issue of causation
(ibid at paras 5-31).
108. See Tanzil Z Chowdhury, “Temporality and Criminal Law Adjudication’s Multiple Pasts”
(2017) 38 Liverpool L Rev 187 at 187-88.
109. Ibid at 188 [emphasis in original].
110. Ibid.
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actual game. Furthermore, Smithers’s overall experience of racism while playing
in the hockey league and the tolerance of said discrimination went unaddressed.
The accumulated impact of these incidents helps to shape an understanding of
Smithers’s conduct on the night in question.
Having situated this article within several areas of scholarship, I next turn to
presenting a counter-story that challenges the Court’s official narrative.

II. PRESENTING A COUNTER-STORY
In this portion of the article, I both deconstruct the Court’s narrative and present
a counter-story that challenges the misrepresentations of Smithers as an aggressor
and Cobby as his victim. To recall, the Court’s concise narrative is reproduced
in its entirety in this article’s introduction, above, and is focused exclusively on
the events of 18 February 1973. The story builds toward Smithers and Cobby’s
fight and its tragic result. This Part is divided into five thematic and chronological
sections: (A) the factual context of Smithers’s experiences with racism prior to
18 February; (B) Smithers’s and Cobby’s encounters during the hockey game
and the racist conduct of spectators on 18 February; (C) Smithers’s and Cobby’s
interactions after they were ejected from the game, building towards, but prior
to, their fight outside the arena; (D) the fight leading to Cobby’s death; and (E)
the events following Cobby’s death, which were left out of the Court’s decision.
A. EXPANDING TIME – THE RACIALIZED CONTEXT LEADING TO
18 FEBRUARY

The temporal center of gravity of the Court’s narrative is fixed on the events of 18
February 1973. For the Court, what preceded that day seemed to have no bearing
with respect to its narrative and construction of Smithers or Cobby. Drawing
from Chowdhury’s work, mentioned in Part I(E), above, I argue that the racism
Smithers endured leading up to 18 February gives much-needed perspective to
his response to the discrimination that he was subjected to that day. This context
provides insight into why Smithers elected not to let the matter drop after the
game and opted instead to pursue Cobby and demand either an apology or a fight.
Smithers had been playing organized ice hockey since the age of eight.111
On 18 February, both Smithers and Cobby were sixteen years old. Smithers was
the only Black player in the midget hockey league in which he played. At trial,
Smithers testified that during the hockey season (which commenced in September
111. DuPree, supra note 85 at C1.

Khoday, Black

Voices Matter Too 593

1972), he was the target of racial epithets from various opposing teams, parents
of such players, and other spectators. The following is an excerpt from Smithers’s
testimony on direct examination with his trial counsel, Arthur Maloney:
Q [Maloney]: What is your recollection in the games that you played of reference
being made to your race and colour?
A [Smithers]: It seemed like every game it was getting a bit more. At the beginning
of the year they didn’t keep bothering me, as the year sort of went on it seemed to
be getting out of hand I would have to say.
Q: What sort of things were you called?
A: [Ni***r], [c**n], things of that aspect, in relation to my colour.
Q: And this wasn’t just the Applewood Team, this was other teams, is that right?
A: I would have to say probably most of them. I wouldn’t say all of them, but most
of them.
Q: Now what about, who would address you in this way?
A: Players, fans, parents, anybody that was at the rink, except for probably spectators
that were for our team I guess.
Q: And what was this state of affairs, would you say this worsened as the season
progressed?
A: Yes.112

These experiences were corroborated by various defence witnesses, including
Smithers’s team’s coach, as well as certain fellow teammates and their parents.
Although Smithers testified that most of the teams would use racist slurs
against him, he and other defence witnesses observed that the Applewood
(Cobby’s team) and Malton teams rivaled each other in their heightened level
of racial aggression toward him.113 The game on 18 February was not the first
time that Smithers and Cobby met on the ice, nor the only time that Cobby
hurled racial insults at Smithers. On the witness stand, Smithers posited that in
at least one previous game, Cobby “said maybe once, or twice, about – you know,
he would call me a stupid [ni***r], something like that, I never really – you know,
let it bother me because he wasn’t really calling me that much.”114 However,
in one news article, a fellow Cooksville player was interviewed stating that
“Cobby always directed racial barbs at Smithers whenever the [Applewood and
112. Smithers v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 506 (Trial Transcript, Vol 4 at 563-64 [Transcript]).
113. Ibid at 564.
114. Ibid at 567.
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Cooksville] teams met.”115 Whatever the frequency (and once was more than
enough), the game on 18 February was not the first instance where Cobby
projected racial epithets at Smithers.
In providing some further context about Cobby’s deployment of racist
language, his use of the n-word was not confined to hockey matches and may
have been deployed casually in his social life. He apparently utilized such
language with at least one Black friend at school. Speaking with a reporter, this
Black friend observed, “Oh, sure, [Cobby] called me a [ni***r] and things like
that. But it was only joking.”116 As a teenager, Cobby’s generalized but developing
perceptions of Black people might be illustrated in a paper he wrote in school—
notably, he wrote a paper that his parents shared with reporters in the years
following his death to demonstrate that their son was not racist and to perhaps
burnish his reputation posthumously. In this paper, written about Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn, for which Cobby earned a B-plus grade, he commented about
the manner in which slaves were mistreated in the southern United States “and
the racial prejudice that is still shown in this day and age of freedom.”117 Cobby
then revealed that the book “also showed me that Negroes are human. I often
wondered if they were any different, although I don’t think I was prejudiced.”118
That one can learn such important lessons from studying literature is perhaps a
testament to its power and significance, yet one would think that even teenagers
in the early 1970s would have learned the basic idea that Black people were
humans prior to that, perhaps from their parents. In this regard, Cobby may have
been ill served by his upbringing.
Leonard and Brenda Cobby gave interviews in the years following their son’s
death. After reading one particular article from 1975, one might arrive at certain
assumptions as to the source of Cobby’s willingness to utter racial epithets at
Smithers. In that article, Leonard Cobby offered the following observation to
Dan Proudfoot:
It was as though our boy was the villain and Smithers lily-white, when actually the
black what’s-it was a dirty hockey player and a violent person. If our boy called him a
name, he bloody well deserved to be called it. I mean, we’re all called names at times,
aren’t we? I mean, that’s the first thing people turn to is your origins, isn’t it? I’ve

115. Ross Thomas Runfola, “He is a Hockey Player, 17, Black and Convicted of Manslaughter,”
The New York Times (27 October 1974) 5-2, online: <timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1974/10/27/issue.html>.
116. Dan Proudfoot, “The Tragedy of Barrie and Paul,” Weekend Magazine (12 July 1975) 4 at 8.
117. Ibid at 6.
118. Ibid.
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been called a limey what’s-it many a time. If they can’t stand the name-calling, then
maybe they shouldn’t be permitted to be in the sport with the white people should they?119

It is worth stressing that Leonard Cobby’s comments were made within two
years of his son’s death and may be representative only of the substantial degree
of anger and resentment that he harboured. While they may not reflect his
views prior to his son’s passing, it would not take a great leap of imagination
to consider that they were indeed his longstanding perspectives and had been
imparted to his son in some manner. Leonard Cobby’s statements represent the
reductive ideas that shouting racial epithets at Smithers was mere name-calling
and deserved, in Leonard Cobby’s mind, if Smithers was a “dirty” player and a
violent person. Furthermore, if Black people cannot stand such name-calling,
they should be excluded from playing with white people. These ideas, of course,
signify that Leonard and Barrie Cobby failed to understand both the magnitude
of racial epithets, including the n-word, and that their use constitutes more than
simple name-calling.
The discrimination directed at Smithers was also connected to his
membership in a particular family unit—one that included his Black father
and white mother.120 This was in an era where interracial relationships were
likely neither prevalent nor widely accepted. A month prior to the game on 18
February, Smithers experienced a particularly vicious encounter with players from
the Malton team after a hockey match. As Smithers and his mother were walking
to their car, players from the Malton team referred to her as “[ni***r] lover”
and “white whore” or “white pig.”121 Smithers, who would normally appear to
take in stride the epithets directed at him during games,122 angrily confronted
their antagonists. He was restrained by his coach, George Spencer, and a ticket
collector at the Malton arena, before a more serious altercation could occur.123
Smithers testified that this verbal assault on his mother “probably bothered me
119. Ibid [emphasis added].
120. See Patrick Scott, “Sympathy eases pain of son’s conviction,” The Toronto Star (25 April 1974)
A3. Scott states that witnesses at the trial testified “that spectators…also taunted [Smithers]
throughout the game because of his color and because his mother was known to be white”
(ibid). Donald Smithers observed that in their eighteen years of marriage, they never really
experienced “real discrimination outside a hockey arena or baseball lot” (ibid). When they
did experience it, Donald Smithers observed, “And it’s always the adults, the other parents,
who cause most of the trouble there” (ibid).
121. Transcript, supra note 112 at 564-65, 634, 649; “Youth tells trial of race insults,” The Toronto
Star (19 April 1974) A3 [“Youth tells trial”].
122. In one article, Smithers advised that “the name-calling has always hurt. He usually didn’t let
it show.” DuPree, supra note 85 at C1.
123. Transcript, supra note 112 at 649.
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more than being called [ni***r] myself.”124 The pain and anger prompted by this
event persisted. In a 1975 interview, Smithers explained that after this incident
in Malton, “he continued to feel angry and frustrated,”125 which suggests that
these feelings carried into the match on 18 February. He observed, “I guess what
happened at Brampton two weeks later had been building up.”126
The racism Smithers suffered on 18 February 1973 did not occur in a vacuum.
By framing the narrative solely in connection with the events of that particular
day, the Court disregarded important and relevant contextual information that
gave meaning to Smithers’s actions during both the hockey game and the fight that
followed. Omitting the context of blatant and permitted racism against Smithers
that occurred over a period of time casts the events of 18 February as random
moments, untethered to a pattern of discrimination perpetrated by, among
others, Cobby and the Applewood team. However, the impact of veiling the
context prior to 18 February is compounded by the Court’s myopic construction
of what transpired during the hockey game and the fight afterwards. In the next
section, I offer a counter-narrative regarding what occurred during the game.
B. THE GAME

The Court’s parsimonious discussion of the events leading to the confrontation
between Smithers and Cobby outside the arena are encapsulated in ten sentences.
In the second sentence, the Court informs the readers that Cobby was sixteen
years old. The Court omits the fact that Smithers was also sixteen years of age
on the night in question. This emphasizes Cobby’s purported youthfulness and
connects it to his untimely death while disregarding Smithers’s adolescence.127
The Court also fails to understand how a sixteen-year-old Black teenager might
react when consistently subjected to racism without any intervention.
The Court’s recapitulation of what transpired during the hockey game is also
remarkably brief. To recall:

124.
125.
126.
127.

Ibid at 565.
Dupree, supra note 85 at C5.
Ibid.
Erasing Smithers’s status as a minor is consistent with a broader phenomenon of the
adultification of Black youth. This involves institutional perceptions of and engagement
with Black boys as adults. This transformation of Black boys into men and criminals
works to “deny Black boys any access to childhood humanity.” See T Elon Dancy III, “The
Adultification of Black Boys: What Educational Settings Can Learn from Trayvon Martin”
in Kenneth J Fasching-Varner et al, eds, Trayvon Martin, Race, and American Justice: Writing
Wrong (Springer, 2014) 49 at 49.
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The game was rough, the players were aggressive and feelings ran high. The
appellant, who is black, was subjected to racial insults by Cobby and other members
of the Applewood team. Following a heated and abusive exchange of profanities, the
appellant and Cobby were both ejected from the game.128

While the Court succinctly acknowledges that Smithers was the target of racial
insults, one might draw from this summary that both Smithers and Cobby
engaged in equally unacceptable behaviour, which justified their simultaneous
ejection from the game. This false moral equivalence, situated within a frugal
reconstruction of the factual matrix, elides much. The Court’s statement that
Smithers was “subjected to racial insults by Cobby and other members of the
Applewood team” does not sufficiently encapsulate either the nature and volume
of the racial violence he endured or the range of actors involved.
According to various witness accounts, including Smithers’s testimony,129
both the Applewood and Cooksville players were aggressive from the outset. While
this aggression was initially physical in nature, the racial invective materialized
around the sixth or seventh minute of play.130 Around this stage of the game,
Smithers tried to gain control of the hockey puck while in a corner near the
Applewood team’s net. Cobby was present there too, as were other players from
both teams.131 As the whistle was blown to stop the play, Cobby proclaimed to
Smithers that he was going to “get” him for “that” and then called him a “dirty
bastard” or a “black bastard.”132 Smithers did not understand the reasons for
Cobby’s outburst.133 In the view of one Crown witness, Smithers purportedly
speared Cobby with his hockey stick, which then prompted Cobby’s angry
response.134 Denying that he had speared Cobby, Smithers acknowledged at trial
that Cobby thought he had done something.135 There appears to be at least two
other accounts that may explain what triggered Cobby’s reaction. As reported in
The Toronto Star, in coverage contemporaneous to the trial (and specifically in
relation to Smithers’s testimony), Cobby’s reaction was prompted by the fact that
128. Smithers, supra note 12 at 508.
129. Transcript, supra note 112 (“it seemed like everybody was sort of playing a dirty
game…” at 568).
130. Smithers testified that up to that point, he did not hear any racial epithets directed at him
(ibid at 568-69).
131. Ibid at 569.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid at 569-70; “Kicking of player was self-defence, accused testifies,” The Globe and Mail (19
April 1974) 8 [“Kicking of player”].
134. Transcript, supra note 112 at 611.
135. Ibid.
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Smithers was able to retrieve the puck from Cobby in the corner.136 No mention
was made in the article of any other physical contact to Cobby that may have
instigated his reaction. In a Washington Post article published in 1975, another
account revealed, “Early in the first period a Cooksville player not Smithers,
elbowed Cobby. Cobby immediately lashed out at Smithers, however, calling
him ‘a dirty black bastard’ and screaming ‘I’ll get you, I’ll get you.’”137 Whichever
version proves most accurate, nothing Smithers did, if anything, justified Cobby’s
reaction or the racist statements that would follow minutes later. Nevertheless,
a downward spiral ensued.
Within minutes of this confrontation, Cobby speared Smithers with his
hockey stick, for which Cobby received a five-minute penalty.138 According to
Smithers’s teammate, Frank Say, Cobby challenged Smithers, stating, “Don’t
think I’m scared of you, I’ll fight you after the game.”139 As Cobby skated to
the penalty box, he continued to holler at Smithers, “Com[e] on, let’s fight you
stupid [ni***r].”140 At the time, Smithers was skating to his own bench to receive
instructions from his coach. Smithers responded to Cobby by saying “okay.”141
The referee admonished Cobby and instructed him to proceed to the penalty
box.142 Being confined to the penalty box did nothing to quell Cobby’s volubility.
He continued to hurl racial vituperations at Smithers, including the n-word.143
Testimony from Crown witnesses also confirmed that, while sitting in the penalty
box, Cobby remained in an angry and agitated state and referred to Smithers as a
“f…ing [ni***r]” a few times.144 According to the testimony of timekeeper Nick
Brouwer, who was sitting in the penalty box while Cobby was serving his penalty,
Cobby referred to Smithers as “[t]hat dirty black bastard” and further declared,
136. “Youth tells trial,” supra note 121.
137. DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
138. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570, 683; Smithers v The Queen, [1978] 1 SCR 506 (Factum of
the Appellant at para 12 [Appellant’s Factum]); “Kicking of player,” supra note 133.
139. Transcript, supra note 112 at 673. From direct and cross-examination of this witness,
it appeared that Say was close enough to hear Cobby’s statements clearly and similarly would
have heard Smithers’s response, if there was any. Say indicated that he did not hear any
response from Smithers (ibid at 677-78).
140. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133.
141. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570. Reporting by David DuPree in the Washington Post
indicates that as Cobby was on his way to the penalty box, he yelled at Smithers, threatening,
“I’ll get you, you black m……….., I’ll get you.” DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
142. Transcript, supra note 112 at 570.
143. Ibid at 570, 612. During cross-examination, Smithers was asked what Cobby was saying to
him. Smithers responded, “To the reference of the colour, like what I said, [ni***r], [c**n]
and stuff like this” (ibid at 612).
144. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 14.
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“I’m fucking going to get him.”145 One can safely conclude from these accounts
that Cobby engaged in overt racism, physical violence, and open exhortations to
fight after the game. Notably, Smithers chose not to respond violently—despite
Cobby’s racially provocative language—and instead focused on the game.
With the Applewood team’s star player serving a five-minute penalty for
spearing, Smithers took advantage of the power play and scored a goal. After
scoring, Smithers skated by the penalty box on the way to his own bench.
As he did so, Cobby launched into a renewed series of racial slurs, with other
Applewood players following his lead.146 Smithers elaborated that these words
included “[f ]…ing [ni***r], stupid [ni***r], [c**n], things like that.”147 Smithers
responded to Cobby with “that will show you.”148 The timekeeper testified that he
heard Smithers utter something to the effect of “[h]a, we got a goal. Showed you
up.”149 Unhinged, Cobby continued to unleash a torrent of racial expletives.150
Smithers recollected that after he reached his bench, Cobby was still yelling
at him from the penalty box.151 Referee Thomas Drew then warned Cobby to
stop and, when he refused, expelled him from the game.152 Drew then skated to
Smithers and similarly ejected him from the game, seemingly for engaging in an
exchange of profanities.153 According to Drew, who testified as a Crown witness,
after Smithers scored his goal and made the comment referenced above to Cobby,
there was an exchange of words between the two players.154 With respect to Drew’s
observational skills, it is notable that, on cross-examination, he testified that he
145. Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 6. In reporting by The Globe and Mail contemporaneous with
the trial, it was reported that Michael Vukobrat, a coach of the Applewood Juvenile hockey
team, stated that Cobby told him, while in the penalty box, that he was “going to get that
‘dirty black bastard.’” “Racial taunts in hockey game ended in fight, witness says,” The Globe
and Mail (10 April 1974) 9 [“Racial Taunts in Hockey Game”]. This reference to Vukobrat
may have been an error. It would seem more logical that Nick Brouwer, as a timekeeper,
would have been present, rather than a coach from Cobby’s team. In either event, there is
consistency between the different reporting of this incident insofar as to what Cobby said in
reference to Smithers.
146. In an interview with The Washington Post, Smithers indicated that Applewood players chanted
“get the [ni***r]…get the [ni***r].” DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
147. Transcript, supra note 112 at 571.
148. Ibid.
149. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 15.
150. Transcript, supra note 112 at 571, 613-14.
151. Ibid at 571.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid at 572, 614.
154. “Boy expected trouble, manslaughter trial told,” The Globe and Mail (9 April 1974) 8 [“Boy
expected trouble”].
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had not heard Smithers being called the n-word or other racial slurs.155 This is
striking, given that Cobby had uttered these words repeatedly and forcefully.
Applewood manager John Lockey testified, “I heard ‘[ni***r]’ and other remarks
with racial overtones and Smithers was retaliating and using the term ‘whitey.’”156
Applewood coach John Beaune also testified that he heard slurs coming from not
only Cobby but also other players from his team.157 The Applewood players did
not appear to suffer any repercussions for employing such language, apart from
Beaune admonishing them to stop the “name-calling” and focus on the game.158
The racialized nature of what transpired before Smithers and Cobby were
ejected from the game was not limited to the players. Testimony at trial conveyed
that spectators also vocally contributed to the racism aimed at Smithers, who
heard their abusive language.159 Speaking more generally, Smithers testified that
those who hurled racist slurs at him included opposing “players, fans, parents,
anybody that was at the rink,” with the probable exception of those who
supported the Cooksville team.160 Smithers posited that this behaviour worsened
as the season progressed.161 Such spectator participation was observed by others.
Smithers’s teammate, goalie Rick Bailey, asserted that while he often heard racial
slurs during past games, it was excessive on the night of 18 February. He explained
that there was “no way you could help but hear it. Players on the ice and people
in the stands were calling Paul a black bastard and stuff like that.”162
The utterance of racial slurs would also be accompanied by ominous
suggestions of violence. Smithers testified that some spectators were shouting
at the Applewood players, encouraging them to “get that [ni***r],” or words to
that effect.163 Other defence witnesses corroborated such spectator misconduct.
Alfred Bartlett, a parent of one of Smithers’s teammates, was present in the stands
the evening of 18 February.164 He witnessed others among his age group (he was
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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161.
162.
163.
164.

Ibid.
“Racial Taunts in Hockey Game,” supra note 145.
Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 6.
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46 at the time of his testimony) refer to Smithers as a “black bastard” and yell out
statements to “get the black bastard” (and possibly other epithets).165 Far from an
isolated incident, Bartlett observed that this was common when he would attend
games in which Smithers was playing.166 Two other defence witnesses, Lorne and
Lorraine Bailey (a married couple and parents of a Cooksville player), took note
of similar behaviour by younger persons.167 Lorne Bailey recalled that there were
“a number of very profane racial comments made by some of the spectators,”
who counselled Applewood players to “get that black bastard.”168 Lorraine Bailey
testified that she overheard teenaged spectators calling Smithers “a black bastard”
and the n-word.169 Both witnesses also overheard some discussion after the game,
among those sitting in front of them, about “getting” Smithers. This suggested
a physical assault, though it was unlikely Smithers would have been able to
hear the threats.170
Before proceeding to the next section, I offer a few observations. The
flagrant, aggravating, and permitted instances of racism directed at Smithers by
Cobby, his teammates, and various spectators provide more than ample context
to comprehend Smithers’s determination to confront Cobby and pre-empt
future racist aggression. To recall an earlier discussion in this article, Smithers’s
experiences on 18 February and in earlier games resemble those of other Black
Canadian hockey players, who were equally subjected to racism from rival
teammates, coaches, and spectators during the 1970s and afterwards. Smithers’s
ordeals were part of a common pattern of behaviour. The Court’s understating of
this broader course of conduct—racial epithets combined with physical violence,
Cobby’s challenges to fight, and further calls to perpetrate violence against
Smithers—behind a feeble acknowledgment that Smithers was subjected to racial
insults was quite simply intentional and condemnable. Notably, the Crown did
not dispute the racialized nature of the hockey game in its factum.171
In providing a broader account, following critical race scholarship, I have
sought to expose, in some small measure, the lived experience of Smithers
during the 18 February game and, in smaller measure, events prior to that day.
By intentionally excluding this context, the Court fostered and reinforced a white
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supremacist caricature of Smithers as a Black “aggressor” with inherent anger
management issues.
Smithers’s treatment prior to and during the game establishes important
context that provides some insight into the events that followed, which led to the
physical confrontation with Cobby outside the arena. The next section examines
what transpired after Smithers and Cobby were ejected from the game.
C. CHASING COBBY? – SEEKING AN APOLOGY OR SEEKING A FIGHT

At this stage of its narrative, the Court explained that after being ejected from
the game, Smithers assumed the role of the “aggressor” for the next forty-five
minutes, which culminated in the fight outside the arena and Cobby’s death.
This resembles the Crown prosecutors’ characterization of Smithers as a “hunter
stalking his prey.”172 Readers are to believe that Cobby suddenly transmogrified
into the hunted, given his purported apprehensiveness to fight and despite his
repeated shows of bravado, entreaties to fight, and racially provocative words
during the game—facts that were excluded from the Court’s narrative. The
counter-story below illustrates that, while Smithers was certainly persistent in
confronting Cobby about the latter’s challenges to fight, labelling Smithers an
“aggressor” misrepresents a more complicated picture. This is especially the case
since, according to his own testimony, Smithers sought an apology from Cobby,
which would have ended the matter. However, it is clear that if he did not receive
an apology, Smithers was prepared to fight in the hope that, whatever the outcome,
he would earn the respect of his detractors and the racial slurs might cease.173
Rather than an aggressive move, Smithers’s readiness to fight could be understood
as defensive and pre-emptive, in light of his overall experiences of racism while
playing Cobby’s and other teams. While Cobby’s willingness to fight may have
diminished after being ejected from the game, he neither hesitated to act in a
dismissive manner toward Smithers nor indicated any fear or apprehensiveness
while in Smithers’s presence.

172. “Youth, 17, guilty in hockey game fight death,” The Toronto Star (23 April 1974) A3
[“Youth, 17, guilty”].
173. Transcript, supra note 112 at 602-604. However naive it might seem to harbour such
hope, others who grew up during this period and experienced racism took to fighting
their tormentors as a way to stem further attacks. See Shree Paradkar, “As a Black student,
he was told to dream small. He had hoped things would change for his son,” The Toronto
Star (6 September 2019), online: <www.thestar.com/news/atkinsonseries/2019/09/06/
as-a-black-student-he-was-told-to-dream-small-but-he-hoped-things-would-changefor-his-son.html>.
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Soon after Smithers and Cobby were ejected from the game, they had a
brief encounter near their respective teams’ dressing rooms. Smithers asked
Cobby whether he still wanted to fight, and said that if so, they should meet
out in the hall in ten minutes.174 Cobby flippantly responded with words to the
effect of “[y]ou shake me up.”175 One of Cobby’s friends provided corroborating
testimony that this encounter transpired and that he was left with the impression
that Cobby was trying to show off to everyone present that he was not afraid
of Smithers.176 After retiring to their dressing rooms, Smithers quickly changed
and then waited outside the Applewood team’s dressing room.177 When the
Applewood team’s manager, John Lockey, exited the room, Smithers asked him if
Cobby still wanted to fight. Lockey advised Smithers to leave and mind his own
business. Smithers refused, responding resolutely, “No, because I want to get this
thing straightened out, I’m not going to take it anymore.”178 Though it would
not necessarily be clear from these words, Smithers testified that he wanted an
apology from Cobby for his conduct and, if Cobby was not prepared to give it,
Smithers was prepared to fight him.179 Lockey observed Smithers saying, “I’m
going to get him.”180 The door to the Applewood dressing room remained ajar,
and Smithers and Cobby were able to make eye contact. Cobby merely sneered
at him.181 Alan Hay, a rink attendant, advised Smithers that if he wanted to
fight, it would have to be outside. At trial, Hay posited that as Smithers walked
away he stated, “Well, I’m going to get him, I’m not going to hurt him, I’m
going to kill him.”182 On cross-examination, Hay clarified that he did not take
Smithers’s words seriously.183 Given the relatively short time that had passed
since being ejected from the game and being the recipient of Cobby’s numerous
174. “Kicking of player,” supra note 133 at 8.
175. Transcript, supra note 112 at 573; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133; Proudfoot,
supra note 116 at 6.
176. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 19.
177. Transcript, supra note 112 at 574.
178. Ibid; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133.
179. Transcript, supra note 112 at 574; “Kicking of player,” supra note 133; “Youth tells trial,”
supra note 121.
180. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 20. The Globe and Mail quotes Lockey as
testifying that Smithers uttered, “I’ve had enough of this. I’m going to get you. I’m going
to get you.” However, it is not clear from the article at what point on the night of the game
Lockey was indicating that this occurred. “Racial Taunts in Hockey Game,” supra note 145.
181. Transcript, supra note 112 at 575.
182. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 21.
183. Ibid at para 22; Proudfoot, supra note 116 (Hay stated in cross examination, “It’s not a threat
you actually take for his word” at 7).
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racial slurs and challenges to fight, it is hardly surprising that Smithers was still
extremely upset. When Crown prosecutor Leo McGuigan confronted Smithers
with evidence of his statements to Hay regarding Cobby, Smithers asserted that
he did not recall saying these words but estimated that he was still upset at the
time over what had recently transpired.184
After several minutes, Cobby had changed into his street clothes and exited
the dressing room with two friends to head to the rink area.185 Smithers, who
appears to have been close by, followed behind, once again inquiring if Cobby
wanted to fight. Cobby replied with “[s]hut up” or words to that effect.186 Cobby
and his friends then situated themselves near the Applewood team’s bench,
while Smithers placed himself elsewhere. Smithers and Cobby were still within
viewing distance of one another and continued to exchange sneers.187 Given
his anger over being thrown out of the game, Smithers also started to quarrel
with, and allegedly directed abusive language at, Thomas Drew, the referee who
had removed him from the game.188 Drew responded by threatening to suspend
Smithers for the rest of the season.189 Undaunted, Smithers persisted with his
vituperative commentary and Drew ended the game.190 As the teams exited the
rink and proceeded to their respective dressing rooms, Smithers followed Cobby
and the Applewood team. Smithers once again asked Cobby if the latter wanted
to fight. As before, Cobby merely told Smithers to “shut up.”191 One of Cobby’s
teammates then warned Smithers, “You had better shut up stupid [ni***r] or he
will have to beat you.”192
Once Cobby and the Applewood team returned to their dressing room,
Smithers waited outside for roughly ten seconds to see if Cobby would emerge.193
He then returned to his team’s dressing room to speak with his teammates. When
asked if he was going to fight Cobby, Smithers explained that he was prepared to
if Cobby wanted to do so.194 When it was suggested to Smithers that he should
wait, so that his teammates could join him, Smithers responded, “If I’m going to
184.
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fight, I’ll fight him myself.”195 Soon after this, someone alerted Smithers that the
Applewood team was leaving their dressing room.
As Smithers exited his team’s dressing room, he followed behind Cobby and
other members of the Applewood team as they ascended a staircase on their way
to leave the building. Smithers stated to Cobby, “Apologize and we will forget
the whole thing.”196 Cobby looked back at Smithers in amazement and then
proclaimed, “Ha, me apologize to you.”197 Given Cobby’s consistently derisive and
racist attitude toward Smithers, it could hardly be surprising that an apology was
not forthcoming, especially with Cobby’s friends and teammates within earshot.
It is worth noting that none of the other Applewood players, who testified as
Crown witnesses, seemed to have heard either Smithers’s request for an apology
or Cobby’s refusal to give one.198 During his testimony, Smithers asserted that
Cobby’s response was “loud enough that I would have thought that anybody who
was around there would have heard it, but evidently I guess they didn’t.”199 Not
surprisingly, this would suggest that someone was not telling the truth. While
that person could have been Smithers, it could also have easily been an individual
who engaged in racism against him or, at the very least, neither stopped nor
openly admonished Cobby for doing so.200 From their perspective, Smithers
unjustifiably killed their friend for nothing more than engaging in insulting
language—language which they likely viewed as part and parcel of the game.
The counter-story I have presented in this section, drawn largely from
Smithers’s testimony, problematizes two aspects of the Court’s narrative: its
195. Ibid at 583.
196. Ibid at 584-85.
197. Ibid at 585; Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 7. In The Globe and Mail’s coverage of the trial
and, in particular, Smithers’s testimony regarding Cobby’s response to his request for an
apology, one article quotes Smithers as recollecting, “Huh? Me apologize to you?” See
“Kicking of player,” supra note 133. Contextually, The Globe and Mail’s phrasing strikes one
as being possibly more accurate as to how the statement was framed and expressed during
Smithers’s testimony.
198. One might add here that Cobby’s friends, who testified for the Crown, also constructed a
particular image of Cobby distinct from the behaviour he exhibited to Smithers. Smithers’s
trial counsel, Arthur Maloney, alerted to the jury in his opening statements, “His friends,
I think perhaps unfairly to Barrie Cobby, have left a picture of a cowering frightened boy.”
Transcript, supra note 112 at 558.
199. Ibid at 585.
200. Lorraine Bailey was given a summons to appear on behalf of the Crown and sat with other
potential Crown witnesses in a room. She observed that Cobby’s friends, who also testified
on behalf of the Crown, viewed the court case as a game. Bailey posited, “It was still a game
for them, they had a great time going over their stories, over everything they testified.”
Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 7.
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characterization of Smithers as an aggressor and Cobby’s apprehension about
fighting. In addition to seeking an apology, Smithers inquired several times of
Cobby whether he still wanted to fight in light of Cobby’s many challenges.
Notably, during the encounters described in this section, Smithers did not
initiate an assault on Cobby. In addition, there are some doubts as to whether
Cobby was truly apprehensive. The factual record is equivocal. While Cobby
seemed to have resiled from his earlier challenges to fight Smithers after the game,
he still maintained a rather dismissive posture and did not appear to exhibit any
fear when in Smithers’ presence. That said, Cobby remained consistently within
proximity of his teammates while Smithers refused to involve his own teammates.
It was also apparent to Smithers that Cobby was unprepared to apologize for his
racist conduct earlier. The next section presents a counter-story regarding the
fight outside the arena.
D. THE FIGHT

The Court’s account of the fight and the moments leading up to it indicate
that Cobby was apprehensive about fighting Smithers and exited the arena in a
hurried manner to a waiting car. Indeed, after Smithers’s unsuccessful attempt to
secure an apology earlier, he followed Cobby and his friends outside the arena.201
Cobby had already descended the staircase when Smithers exited.202 While some
testimony suggested that Cobby was hurrying away to escape from Smithers,
at least three Crown witnesses observed that Cobby merely walked down the
stairs.203 One of these witnesses even testified that Cobby “was taking his time
walking downstairs.”204 This conflicting testimony establishes that it was less than
evident that Cobby was hurrying to an awaiting car to avoid Smithers.
Soon after Smithers exited the building, the Applewood team manager, John
Lockey, briefly restrained Smithers by grabbing his arms from behind.205 However,
Lockey then relinquished his hold and Smithers proceeded down the staircase.206
What transpired after proceeded very rapidly. According to the Court, “[t]he
appellant caught up with [Cobby] at the bottom of the outside steps and directed
one or two punches to Cobby’s head.”207 Nothing is said about Cobby’s posture
201.
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or the forcefulness of the punches—neither is insignificant. Drawing from
Smithers’s testimony, as he approached, he observed that Cobby’s arms were raised
and positioned at a ninety-degree angle.208 Perceiving that Cobby was prepared to
strike him,209 Smithers threw a punch, but merely grazed Cobby’s chin.210
After striking Cobby’s face, Smithers was almost immediately and aggressively
restrained by Cobby’s friends or teammates.211 To recall the Court’s account,
“[s]everal of Cobby’s team mates grabbed the appellant and held him.”212
Missing in this statement is the dangerously aggressive nature of the restraint,
which would likely affect the forcefulness of the kick Smithers later delivered.
One of the individuals who restrained Smithers, Richard Link, was positioned
behind Smithers, grabbed him aggressively around his neck, and pulled back
with force.213 Meanwhile, at least two others, Bruce Rowbotham and James
Cooper, grabbed Smithers’s arms.214 Smithers testified that his head was tilted
back because Link “had a pretty tight grip on my neck”215 and was pulling “fairly
hard.”216 Smithers further explained, with respect to Link’s hold, “Like he wasn’t
exactly choking me, he had a firm enough grip if I moved, you know, he probably
would have been choking me.”217 On cross-examination, Smithers posited that

208. Transcript, supra note 112 at 586, 626 (“[Cobby] had his hands up at the same angle as he
did when he was ready to punch, I can’t recall they may have been closed, or they may have
been open, but they were up as if he was going to strike me” at 626).
209. “Kicking of player,” supra note 133 (reporting that Smithers testified, “I thought he was
ready to hit me, so I punched him. I punched him more or less instinctively”).
210. Transcript, supra note 112 at 586, 625.
211. Ibid at 586-87; Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 33; DuPree, supra note 85 at C5;
Proudfoot, supra note 116 at 7. According to an article published in The Globe and Mail
during the trial, Applewood coach, John Beaune testified that he was present and intervened
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213. Appellant’s Factum, supra note 138 at para 34; Transcript, supra note 112 at 587; DuPree,
supra note 85 at C5.
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the force Link applied to his neck indeed hurt him physically.218 Accordingly, this
was hardly a simple and relatively benign act of grabbing and holding Smithers,
as the Court presented. Rather, it was an overtly aggressive action—one which
could potentially restrict the restrained person’s ability to breathe properly.
We have now reached the critical stage of the narrative where Smithers
delivered a kick to Cobby’s stomach area. To recall, the Court explained,
“While Cobby was thus bent over, and approximately two to four feet from
the appellant, the appellant delivered what was described as a hard, fast kick to
Cobby’s stomach area.”219 Notably, from this official version, Cobby is clearly
portrayed as a victim who was kicked while in a vulnerable or defensive state;
that is, he was bent over. By contrast, Smithers’s account reveals a role inversion.
With respect to Cobby’s posture at the time of the kick, Smithers testified
during cross-examination, “When they were all holding me, [Cobby] sort of
turned around and started coming towards me sir, like in a manner that he was
ready to hit me, or something, hit me or kick me, or whatever sir.”220 On this
reading, Cobby was prepared to opportunistically and cowardly assault Smithers
while Smithers was in a compromised position and his head was being forcibly
pulled back by Link.
Feeding into the Court’s perception of Cobby as the victim, and Smithers as
the unmitigated aggressor, is the characterization of the kick delivered—“a hard,
fast kick to Cobby’s stomach area.”221 However, the forcefulness of the kick was
in dispute at trial. Indeed, the aggressive nature of Smithers’s restraint provides
important contextual information. It is indeed questionable just how potent
Smithers’s kick might have been while he was being forcibly pulled back in the
position described in his testimony. At trial, Smithers himself posited confidently
that his kick was in fact not forceful.222 When Smithers was cross-examined by
Crown prosecutor Leo McGuigan about how he was so positive that the kick was
not delivered with great force, he responded, “If you are hitting something solid
you can sort of just tell, it felt like it was a very light kick. I know it was a light
kick, I know, I could just tell.”223 In addition, others testified that Smithers was
heard expressing this similar reflection about the weakness of the kick soon after

218. Ibid at 628 (“Well the guy that had me around the neck sort of hurt my neck a bit, but
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the incident.224 In other words, Smithers’s recollection of the feebleness of his
kick was not manifested solely at the trial. Furthermore, the strength of Smithers’s
kick was also placed in doubt by a Crown witness who was present during the
fight.225 According to this witness’s testimony, Smithers’s right leg came up as a
result of being pulled back and losing his balance.226 The witness further observed
that Smithers’s leg did not come up to the kicking point due to the struggle.227
Together, such evidence impugns the singular notion that Smithers delivered a
hard, swift kick to a purportedly vulnerable Cobby. Indeed, the leg movement
that the Court characterized as a kick appears to be scarcely voluntary—that is,
an act that “resulted from the choice of a conscious mind and an autonomous
will”—if voluntary at all.228
E.

AFTER THE FIGHT

After documenting the fight and Cobby’s death,229 the Court moved swiftly to
the medical testimony. In this section, I present an account of what took place
following the kick, which incorporates the seeming reluctance of many, including
Cobby’s friends and teammates, to provide assistance to Cobby. The following
counter-narrative also offers an indication of Smithers’s confused and distraught
reaction to what had just occurred, as well as the impact of being the target of
repeated racial slurs.
Soon after the kick, Cobby fell to the ground and was seen gasping for
air.230 As was later testified through medical testimony, Cobby passed away
after asphyxiating on his own vomit, which passed into his trachea due to a
malfunctioning epiglottis.231 One defence witness, Alfred Bartlett, posited that
while Cobby was laying on the ground struggling to breathe, there seemed to be
little effort by his friends, teammates, or other adults present, either to assist him
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or to call for medical assistance.232 Bartlett explained that he arrived after the fight
and observed Cobby lying on the ground gasping for breath.233
When Bartlett approached Cobby to provide assistance, he remarked to the
Applewood players present, “I hope you are proud of yourselves what happened
here [sic].”234 They responded by telling him to “[f ]… off” and to “leave [Cobby]
alone.”235 Bartlett refused, telling them, “This boy is hurt and he needs help.”236
Indeed, after being admonished by Smithers’s coach, George Spencer, to not
get involved, Bartlett reiterated that “[t]his boy is hurt and hurt bad.”237 After
calling over to another adult bystander to assist him, Bartlett proceeded to pump
Cobby’s chest while the other individual attempted to provide mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation.238 Bartlett directed Cobby’s teammates to place their jackets over
Cobby to keep him warm. Bartlett asked these teenagers whether they had called
for an ambulance, to which they responded, “[n]o.”239 He instructed one or more
of them to go inside and call for one and for the police. Soon after, Bartlett
noticed that Cobby had stopped breathing and that he could not feel a pulse.240
On cross-examination, Bartlett’s account regarding his assistance to Cobby
and the failure of Cobby’s teammates to provide much aid was not seriously
challenged, but for a very brief exchange. Crown prosecutor Leo McGuigan
asked, “If I understand your evidence, you got in your car, you started it up,
drove it up, got out and you were really the first one who gave any assistance
or help?”241 Bartlett replied that this was correct.242 McGuigan inquired, “That’s
your evidence?” Bartlett responded, “That’s my evidence.” McGuigan concluded,
“Fine, thank you.”243 While one could infer that McGuigan was expressing
incredulity about Bartlett’s testimony, he did not refer to the testimony of
any Crown witnesses to contradict Bartlett’s account, something he did when
cross-examining and challenging the accounts of other witnesses, such as Smithers.
232.
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Meanwhile, after Cobby collapsed, Smithers returned to the inside of the
arena and remained with Lorne and Lorraine Bailey. He did not flee the scene.
Given the violent way that he was restrained and the nature of the kick as he
recalled it, Smithers appeared to be bewildered as to how the kick could have
resulted in hurting Cobby. As Smithers stood with the Baileys, one of Cobby’s
teammates uttered to him, “I hope you are satisfied you black bastard he is
hurt.”244 Smithers then expressed to the Baileys, “I couldn’t have hit him that
hard, I just don’t believe I could have hurt him.”245
Soon after the call was placed for medical assistance, Police Constable
James Vanhaverbeke arrived on the scene. He could detect no signs of a pulse or
respiration from Cobby.246 After entering the arena, he walked toward Smithers.
Vanhaverbeke testified that as he approached Smithers, the latter stated, “I’m
the one you want. Can I call my parents, I don’t want to say anything until
I talk to my parents.”247 As Vanhaverbeke escorted Smithers to his police
cruiser, he heard Smithers repeatedly say, “I didn’t kick him that hard.”248
On cross-examination, Vanhaverbeke acknowledged that Smithers was “sobbing
and highly distraught.”249 Salient to the impact of the repeated racial insults to
which Smithers was subjected, Vanhaverbeke also testified that on their walk to
the police cruiser, Smithers asserted, “He called me [ni***r], every game, I’m sick
of it, that’s all I got [ni***r], [ni***r].”250 Smithers also opined to Vanhaverbeke
that “the fight was started on the ice, and it had started a long time ago.”251
Vanhaverbeke placed Smithers in his police car. Detective Sergeant Barry King
arrived at the scene soon after. After learning of Cobby’s death, he approached
Vanhaverbeke’s cruiser and observed Smithers sitting in the car with “his head
down toward his knees” and crying.252 After informing Smithers that Cobby had
died, he noticed Smithers further break down and cry.253
The Court’s portrayal of Smithers as an aggressor, as opposed to a victim
of racial violence who demonstrated both agency and suffering, advances a
white supremacist narrative. Its narrative denies recognition of Smithers’s
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humanity, including the impact of racist and threatening conduct towards him,
his appreciation that Cobby was injured, and his reaction when he learned of
Cobby’s death.
Through this entire counter-story, we learn about the significant impact that
racism had on Smithers. I have offered a version of events that was largely kept
out of the Court’s reductive narrative and its characterization of Smithers: A Black
aggressor preying on his white teenage victim. Given the evidence available
to the Court through the trial transcript, along with pointed references to the
evidence by Smithers’s appellate counsel William McMurtry in both written
and oral submissions,254 the Court’s one-sided narration and characterization
cannot be seen as anything but deliberate and intentional. The Court opted to
project a particularly misleading story and representation of Smithers, despite the
complexity offered in the record.
The Court’s narrative of the events is not the only problematic feature of
the case. A broader reading of the case history also points to concerns about the
prosecution’s efforts during the trial to minimize Smithers’s experiences of racism
while playing hockey and the role that racism played in jury deliberations. I turn
to these issues next.

III. MINIMIZING RACISM
Thus far, I have focused most of my attention on providing a counter-narrative
to the Court’s decision by emphasizing the role that race played. However, the
Court is not the only actor that minimized the significance of racism in the case.
In this Part, I examine primarily the Crown prosecutors’ role in diminishing the
importance of race and the moral culpability of those who engaged in racism
against Smithers. Such minimization ties into a larger social expectation that
Smithers endure the racialized verbal and physical assaults, both on and off the
ice, and not respond violently.
During litigation, notwithstanding the clear evidence of racist slurs being
projected at Smithers, Crown prosecutors made distinct efforts to undermine the
role of racism and its impact. When prosecutor Leo McGuigan cross-examined
Smithers, he asserted that he did not condone racism.255 Yet during his closing
arguments, McGuigan sought to dismiss the racial animus inherent in statements
254. See Mary Trueman, “Justices cool to points in racial slaying appeal,” The Globe and Mail
(11 February 1977) 9. William McMurtry replaced his brother Roy McMurtry as Smithers’s
counsel before the Court.
255. Transcript, supra note 112 at 599.
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expressed by both Applewood players and spectators. He conveyed that such
expressions were made in the heat of the moment and did not demonstrate that
such persons were prejudiced, “otherwise Applewood would not be a good place
to live in.”256 This illustrates a problematic commitment to rehabilitating racists
and protecting discriminatory language by obscuring the obvious racial hatred
and violence behind the words. McGuigan’s statements suggest a special degree
of deliberate ignorance to the frequency and level of racial hostility directed at
Smithers during both the game on 18 February and prior matches. It is exactly
this type of underlying tolerance of racism that allowed Cobby, his teammates,
and spectators to feel empowered to bully and racially abuse Smithers in a manner
that was clearly threatening and intimidating.
The prosecution’s efforts to downplay the racism directed at Smithers was
also exemplified in comments made by McGuigan’s co-counsel John Greenwood,
who seemed critical of the attention given to the case because of Smithers’s race.
In a literal appeal to colour blindness regarding a case about racial discrimination,
Greenwood observed, “If you take away Smithers’ color, there wouldn’t be so
much attention given this case [sic].”257 In addition, Greenwood offered that “[i]f
Smithers were white…[t]here probably wouldn’t be so much public concern.
He probably would have been convicted and that would have been that.”258 This
was strikingly obtuse. The likely reasons that the case received such attention
(including international coverage in The New York Times and The Washington
Post) were the degree of racism Smithers experienced because he was Black and the
fact that he fought back against it. Furthermore, but for the discrimination and
repeated racial slurs directed at Smithers, there would have been no reason for
him to confront Cobby after the game.
While unable to sweep such blatant racism under the rug, the prosecution
argued that Smithers was largely unaffected by these racist slurs, as he was
accustomed and conditioned to hearing such words thrusted at him. McGuigan
questioned Smithers about whether he was conditioned to hearing racist terms
directed at him. Smithers responded, “I get conditioned to a certain amount of
it, but that was an excess amount of it that I received that night.”259 McGuigan
then inquired if “in the course of the heat of a hockey game things are said from
one player to another in which it means no more than the fact that it’s said

256.
257.
258.
259.

“Youth, 17, guilty,” supra note 172.
DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
Ibid.
Transcript, supra note 112 at 631.
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in the part of the hockey game?”260 In response, Smithers acknowledged that
“certainly a lot of things do get said in a hockey game, but there’s no reason for
the fact for him calling me as continuously as he did, it was more than obvious
that it wasn’t just in the heat of the hockey game as far as I am concerned sir.”261
McGuigan suggested to Smithers that the utterance of racial terms directed at
him (as a Black person) was no different than what other nationalities commonly
experience from time to time.262 Smithers recognized that such derogatory terms
are uttered, but returned to the fact that the continuous and excessive use of
racist slurs aimed at him indicated that it was “more or less personal.”263 Smithers
maintained, “I think it was really meant to hurt me more than anything.
There’s quite a difference, that’s the way I feel, that is my opinion.”264 Perhaps
emblematic of the Crown’s insensitivity to Smithers and his experience of racism,
and the Crown’s dismissiveness of this history, McGuigan then asked, “Do you
feel you might be over sensitive on that [sic]?”265 Smithers replied, “No I have
been brought up with it all my life, but I still, you know, I don’t understand why
I had to go through what -- why [Cobby] had to persist on that continuously. You
know he excessed it, quite obviously.”266 McGuigan’s questioning points to two
things: Either Smithers was accustomed to the racism, and it really had no effect
on him, or he was simply over-sensitive because the derogatory name-calling
was part and parcel of the game. This was the crude and unsophisticated binary
offered to Smithers. In either event, the Crown sought to invalidate Smithers’s
experience of racism and its impact on him.
Smithers’s acknowledgement during cross-examination of being accustomed
to some level of racism may have been partly performative and meant to
demonstrate his masculinity and toughness in a notoriously violent sport. Like
other Black players, he was expected to endure such racism. Washington Post
journalist David DuPree wrote about Smithers’s case in 1975. In the course of
researching, he interviewed Smithers and others. Regarding the racial epithets
hurled at Smithers, DuPree wrote, “Smithers says the name-calling has always
hurt. He usually didn’t let it show.”267 Following the trial, Smithers was granted
bail pending appeal. He continued to play hockey and was still subjected to
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
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racial slurs. Smithers commented to DuPree, “And people still call me [ni***r].
That’s the most degrading thing anybody can call me, but I guess I’m just
supposed to take it.”268
What emerges is the idea that a Black player, when faced with racial slurs,
should simply sustain the taunts and not be “over-sensitive.” When trial court
Justice B. Barry Shapiro sentenced Smithers to six months’ incarceration in an
adult training centre in Brampton,269 he encouraged Smithers to continue playing
sports.270 However, he counselled Smithers to “restrain his temper” and that,
“[i]n case of racial insults, you should seek redress in a nonviolent manner.”271
This demands that victims of racial discrimination, such as Smithers, keep their
cool in the face of patent verbal and physical aggression in addition to explicitly
threatening and intimidating behaviour. It expects nothing of racial aggressors to
hold their animus in check and refrain from verbalizing their prejudices.
Justice Shapiro’s advice harkened to imagery of Black athletes who have
shouldered the racism aimed at them. Such symbolism was weaponized against
Smithers. For example, a white spectator once told him, “Jackie Robinson took
it, you better learn how to take it, too.”272 As is well known, Robinson was the
first Black player in Major League Baseball and was subjected to racism by fellow
players, opponents, and spectators.273 As part of the quid pro quo in being
permitted to play, Robinson needed to demonstrate his ability to endure the
racism foisted on him.274 Robinson was seen as a hero for his accomplishments, for
being a sports pioneer, and for not giving in to his justified anger. Consequently,
Robinson’s stoicism as an adult was weaponized against Smithers, who, unlike
Robinson, was still a teenager. Smithers’s father, Donald, further posited that,
at the time of the tragic game against Applewood, “Paul was just a young boy.
Who can say he should have controlled his emotions when players and fans were
calling him ‘[ni***r]’ every game? He was bound to explode.”275 More generally,
the elder Smithers asserted that over the course of the trial, there was an attitude
or expectation
268. Ibid at C5.
269. Michael Solomon, “Supporters crowded courthouse as Smithers gets six months,” The Globe
and Mail (5 June 1974) 1.
270. DuPree, supra note 85 at C5.
271. Ibid.
272. Ibid at C1.
273. See Jonathan Eig, Opening Day: The Story of Jackie Robinson’s First Season (Simon & Shuster,
2007) at 38-45, 74-76.
274. Ibid at 27-28.
275. Runfola, supra note 115.
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that a black person should go out on the ice and just let people call him a “[ni***r]”
or whatever, even if it comes from parents (in the stands), and that you shouldn’t
lose your cool. That there was a white boy killed because you couldn’t take it being
called [ni***r].276

Leaving aside Donald Smithers’s partiality, his statements were reasonable and
tacitly pointed to the repeated failure of league officials to respond to the racism
his son experienced.

IV. SUSPECTED RACIAL BIAS AND THE JURY
Racism played a feature role in the events leading up to Cobby’s death, despite
the Supreme Court’s efforts to obscure it. There were also valid concerns that
racial prejudice may have played a role in the jury’s decision making. This should
hardly be surprising. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario acknowledged in 1993:
Racism, and in particular anti-black racism, is a part of our community’s psyche.
A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist views. A much
larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of negative racial stereotypes.
Furthermore, our institutions, including the criminal justice system, reflect and
perpetuate those negative stereotypes. These elements combine to infect our society
as a whole with the evil of racism. Blacks are among the primary victims of that
evil.277

This would have been no less the case some nineteen years earlier, when Smithers’s
trial occurred in 1974. Concerns about empanelling persons with racial bias
persist today.278 As Randall Kennedy observes, when the n-word is explicitly
invoked in the context of jury deliberations, this taints the process and can also
impact jurors who hear such language.279
At Smithers’s trial, the jury heard testimony over a two-week period. Justice
Shapiro instructed the jury that they could find Smithers guilty either of unlawful
act manslaughter or on the lesser and included crime of “common assault.”280
The jurors took two hours to deliberate before arriving at their verdict, finding
Smithers guilty of unlawful act manslaughter.281 Those empanelled to determine
276. Gerald Seniuk, “Smithers once afraid, now vows he will fight,” The Globe and Mail (5
June 1974) 10.
277. Parks, supra note 10 at 369.
278. See R v Johnson, 2020 ONSC 3673.
279. Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word (Pantheon Books, 2002) at 57-60.
280. Smithers, supra note 12 at 511; “Youth, 17, guilty,” supra note 173.
281. “Mississauga Youth Guilty in Fight Death After Hockey Game,” The Globe and Mail (23
April 1974) 1.
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Smithers’s guilt were nine men and three women, all white. This did not in itself
mean that the entire jury was biased, though it reflects a problematic and systemic
lack of representation and diversity. Yet in light of Cobby’s malfunctioning
epiglottis and the seemingly tenuous connection between Smithers’s kick and
Cobby’s asphyxiation, the jury’s verdict triggered (or perhaps confirmed)
suspicions of racism or some underlying agenda. Joyce Smithers commented to
a Globe and Mail reporter that “the jury made it a political type of thing. They
made it themselves.”282 Though no further explanation was provided, perhaps the
political motive Joyce Smithers alluded to was in an all-white jury finding her
son guilty of having challenged the anti-Black racism of his tormentors. When
Dr. Ross Runfola interviewed Smithers and others for his article, published
in The New York Times, Runfola asked Smithers why he had been convicted
of manslaughter. Runfola reported, “Without pause, [Smithers] blurted out,
‘Because I’m [B]lack.’”283 Runfola added that Smithers then “quickly offered an
opinion designed to be more acceptable to his father, who is standing nearby.”284
Smithers clarified, “No. The fact that I’m [B]lack is not the point. Any 12 decent
people would have found me not guilty. I think I got a bad deal from the jury,
especially in view of the medical testimony.”285
The following year, Smithers provided further insights on racism and the
jury. Dan Proudfoot, writing for Weekend Magazine in 1975, interviewed the
Smithers family for his article. Proudfoot wrote, “Paul Smithers and his parents
were sure the jury had been racist in its verdict, as sure as Paul had been that
Barrie Cobby had been a racist calling him a [ni***r] and a [c**n] during the
game.”286 Anticipating some doubts about this statement, Smithers offered:
I know, I know, white people think [B]lacks are always looking for racism where
there isn’t any, […] but believe me, I knew that jury would find me guilty. You can
tell, just looking somebody in the face, whether they’re prejudiced or not – and the
only time those people looked at me was when something came out that made me
look bad. I knew what to expect from those people.287

Smithers’s intuitions about the jury’s attitudes toward him may have been
accurate, at least in part. Information came to light in 1975 that one of the
female jurors at his trial expressed views indicating a racial bias against Smithers.
282.
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This was revealed in an interview with Leonard and Brenda Cobby, who were
lamenting their son’s vilification as a racist in the news coverage of the trial.
Leonard Cobby posited:
It was so slanted. I mean, we know one of the jurors, she lives near here, who said
she knew after two or three days of the trial that the ‘Black Basket’ was guilty. But
anybody reading the newspapers bloody well wouldn’t have been able to come to
that conclusion.288

It is worth noting that the defence started to call their own witnesses on 18 April,
while the Crown began calling witnesses as early as 8 April. Thus, if the juror
“knew after two or three days of the trial” that Smithers was guilty,289 this would
mean that she had already prejudged the case before hearing all of the Crown’s
evidence, much less from the defence’s witnesses.
Following on the heels of Leonard Cobby’s statements, Smithers’s new counsel
(and future Attorney General and Chief Justice of Ontario), Roy McMurtry,
wrote to Federal Minister of Justice Otto Lang requesting ministerial review due
to jury bias and seeking a new trial.290 He based the request on the Proudfoot
article.291 In his letter, McMurtry expressed, “One could also draw the inference
that if one of the jurors was prepared to speak so openly about the matter, that in
all probability there were other jurors harboring similar prejudices.”292 In support
of McMurtry’s letter and his former client, Smithers’s trial counsel (and appellate
counsel before the Court of Appeal for Ontario), Arthur Maloney, dispatched his
own communication to Lang, dated 6 August 1975. Maloney asserted, “It seems
to me that if there is any reason whatsoever to believe that even one member of
the jury, motivated by racial hatred, had made up his mind in advance of hearing
the evidence, that this should in itself be a ground for a new trial.”293
In his written communication, Maloney provided further information
supporting the position that a juror was racially biased against Smithers.
Independent of Leonard Cobby’s disclosure about one juror, Maloney had
learned from a separate source that the daughter of a juror expressed surprise

288. Ibid at 8.
289. Ibid.
290. See “Juror’s dislike of blacks called grounds for new trial,” The Globe and Mail (23 August
1975) 3 [“Juror’s dislike of blacks”]. McMurtry took over the case when Maloney was
appointed as Ombudsman for the province. See “Bias investigation unlikely until court
appeal ends,” The Toronto Star (26 August 1975) A3 [“Bias investigation unlikely”].
291. Proudfoot, supra note 116.
292. “Juror’s dislike of blacks,” supra note 290.
293. Ibid.
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that her mother was empanelled, since “she had a dislike of Negroes.”294 The
juror’s daughter purportedly further advised “that there was only one person who
disliked Negroes more [than her mother], and that was her father.”295 Maloney
revealed that the daughter relayed this information to a lawyer named F.G. Felkai.
Felkai, in turn, informed Maloney of the statements a few days after the trial.
When The Globe and Mail followed up with Felkai about the identity of the juror,
he refused to disclose her identity but indicated that if the matter proceeded to a
new trial, he would do so at that time.296
The Department of Justice responded to McMurtry’s letter and indicated
that it would consider reviewing the jury issue following the Court decision.297
After the Court’s ruling to affirm the decisions below, Smithers began to serve
his six-month sentence and was ultimately paroled after three months.298 After
his release, the Smithers family was in communication with the Department of
Justice regarding the application for ministerial review initiated by McMurtry in
1975.299 Following the Court’s dismissal of Smithers’s appeal, the Department
did not pursue the matter because there was, in its view, no further request from
Smithers’s counsel to do so.300 However, even if such a request had been made,
where ministerial review is granted the usual remedy is a retrial. At this stage,
Donald Smithers was seeking not a retrial but a public investigation into the
original trial and, particularly, the issue of whether one or more jurors were
racially biased against his son.301 The Department of Justice indicated that such an
investigation would be within the purview of the Attorney General of Ontario.302
There is no indication that any public investigation was ever undertaken on the
issue of racism among the jurors, let alone any other issue surrounding the trial.
No concerns regarding the jury were mentioned in the Court’s decision.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See “Bias investigation unlikely,” supra note 290.
See “Smithers allowed to work outside,” The Toronto Star (14 June 1977) B1; “Jailed in
hockey death Paul Smithers paroled,” The Toronto Star (12 August 1977) B2.
See “Father seeking probe on trial of Smithers,” The Globe and Mail (15 September 1977) 57
[“Father seeking probe”].
Ibid.
Ibid. See also “Smithers is allowed out on parole in middle of manslaughter term,” The Globe
and Mail (15 August 1977) 5.
See “Father seeking probe,” supra note 299.

620

(2021) 58 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

V. CONCLUSION
This article tells a historical counter-narrative of the Smithers case. It draws
substantially from the perspective of Paul Smithers, through both his testimony
at trial and interviews in the years immediately following it. It is a story that
highlights his experiences of anti-Black racism, their impact on him, and his
attempts to resist such discrimination. The case and its racial dimensions have
remained hitherto unnoticed in Canadian legal histories on race. This study
has sought to fill this gap. In presenting this counter-story, I have attempted to
challenge the Court’s official narrative, largely on the basis that it substantially
understates the extent and depth of Cobby’s racial transgressions, which were
perpetrated in the presence of both adults who participated in the discrimination
and arena officials who failed to intervene.
As the Court is an appellate court, it made no formal findings of fact.
Nevertheless, in narrating the facts of the Smithers case, the Court relied on a
selective interpretation of the evidence presented at the jury trial. The Court’s
factual matrix projects an especially Crown-oriented view of the events. It does
not even acknowledge the conflicting evidence presented by the defence. One
might divine from this that writing a case history is a zero-sum game, which
must be told in a rather caricatured manner and solely from the perspective of the
legal victor—here, the Crown.303 But more devastating and condemnable is the
fact that the Court’s portrayal of Smithers as an angry Black aggressor, together
with their obscurement of the deep-seated and systemic racism he experienced,
strongly resemble a white supremacist narrative of what transpired, even if the
Justices themselves harboured no obvious or actual racial animus. This may be
a harsh statement. However, I am reminded of African-American legal scholar
D. Marvin Jones’s observation that Black men “are perceived as congenitally
disobedient and lawless. This is true because of how white male ideas about
manhood distinguished between man—read civilized man—and savage.”304
By presenting the facts in the way that it chose to, the Court in Smithers left itself
open to such criticism.

303. I am drawn here to Jim Phillips’s point that “like all history, legal history produces ‘winners’
and ‘losers.’ Losers are those whose vision of society and belief systems lost out in the struggle
with other visions.” In a similar vein, losers may include parties in a legal dispute whose
version of events lost out. “Why Legal History Matters” (2010) 41 VUWLR 293 at 308.
304. “‘We’re All Stuck Here for a While’: Law and the Social Construction of the Black Male”
(1998) 24 J Contemp L 35 at 48.
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In addition to providing a counter-narrative, this article also highlighted the
Crown prosecutors’ role in minimizing the impact of race in the case. Lastly, this
article brought renewed attention to concerns about overt racial bias, regarding
at least one member of the jury, as well as systemic discrimination, as the jury
was all white. Echoing the Washington Supreme Court’s recognition of its own
contribution to the devaluation of Black lives, my hope is that this article will
encourage Canadian courts and other actors within the legal system to reflect
on their contributions to such devaluation of both Black lives and Black voices.
Though the outcome might not be any different, a one-sided story does not
serve the ends of justice—certainly not when the story of a victim of racial
violence is erased.
The Smithers case, despite the concerns raised above about the manner in
which the facts are represented, is taught annually in most, if not all, criminal
law courses across Canada. It is not a decision buried in a vast sea of thousands
of forgotten Supreme Court judgments. This is not a judgment that is allowed
to be forgotten. In crafting this counter-narrative, I have tried to allow for a
long-silenced Black voice to pierce through the juridical veil. At the very least,
we can now engage with the factual matrix of the case anew, through a lens
that demonstrates greater sensitivity to the systemic racism that continues
in Canada—a matter of tremendous importance for criminal law.305 Or,
alternatively, one may choose to remain deliberately ignorant and disregard this
broader understanding of the case in favour of the official tale that was spun, over
forty years ago, by the Supreme Court.

305. Indeed, we could also ask whether a case similar to Smithers, if decided today with a
racially diverse jury, would produce different conclusions on a number of issues including
voluntariness, causation, or self-defence.

